Some things are in our control and others not. Things in our control
are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are
our own actions. Things not in our control are body, property, reputation,
command, and, in one word, whatever are not our own actions.
-- Epictetus, Enchiridion (55-135b.c.)
Through this kinship with the flesh, some of us inclining to it
become like wolves, faithless and treacherous and mischievous: some
become like lions, savage and untamed; but the greater part of us
become foxes and other worse animals. For what else is a slanderer and
a malignant man than a fox, or some other more wretched and meaner
animal? See, then, and take
-- Epictetus, The Discourses (55-135b.c.)
For it is always true that to whatever point the perfecting of anything
leads us, progress is an approach toward this point.
-- Epictetus, The Discourses (55-135b.c.)
Because the gods
have given the vine, or wheat, we sacrifice to them: but because
they have produced in the human mind that fruit by which they designed
to show us the truth which relates to happiness, shall we not thank
God for this?
-- Epictetus, The Discourses (55-135b.c.)
From everything which is or happens in the world, it is easy to
praise Providence, if a man possesses these two qualities, the faculty
of seeing what belongs and happens to all persons and things, and a
grateful disposition. If he does not possess these two qualities,
one man will not see the use of things which are and which happen;
another will not be thankful for them, even if he does know them.
-- Epictetus, The Discourses (55-135b.c.)
But God has introduced man to be a
spectator of God and of His works; and not only a spectator of them,
but an interpreter. For this reason it is shameful for man to begin
and to end where irrational animals do, but rather he ought to begin
where they begin, and to end where nature ends in us; and nature
ends in contemplation and understanding, in a way of life
conformable to nature. Take care then not to die without having been
spectators of these things.
-- Epictetus, The Discourses (55-135b.c.)
For what is the end proposed in reasoning?
To establish true propositions, to remove the false, to withhold
assent from those which are not plain.
-- Epictetus, The Discourses (55-135b.c.)
where a man is against his will, there he is in prison.
-- Epictetus, The Discourses (55-135b.c.)
for as to intelligence you are not inferior to
the gods nor less; for the magnitude of intelligence is not measured
by length nor yet by height, but by thoughts.
-- Epictetus, The Discourses (55-135b.c.)
I do not care. "I
will show you that I am master." You cannot do that. Zeus has set me
free: do you think that he intended to allow his own son to be
enslaved?
-- Epictetus, The Discourses (55-135b.c.)
Epaphroditus had a shoemaker whom he sold because he was good for
nothing. This fellow by some good luck was bought by one of Caesar's
men, and became Caesar's shoemaker. You should have seen what
respect Epaphroditus paid to him: "How does the good Felicion do, I
pray?" Then if any of us asked, "What is master doing?" the answer "He
is consulting about something with Felicion." Had he not sold the
man as good for nothing? Who then made him wise all at once? This is
an instance of valuing something else than the things which depend
on the will.
-- Epictetus, The Discourses (55-135b.c.)
What then is education? Education is the learning how to adapt the
natural precognitions to the particular things conformably to
nature; and then to distinguish that of things some are in our
power, but others are not; in our power are will and all acts which
depend on the will; things not in our power are the body, the parts of
the body, possessions, parents, brothers, children, country, and,
generally, all with whom we live in society.
-- Epictetus, The Discourses (55-135b.c.)
Not death is evil, but a shameful death.
Confidence then ought to be employed against death, and caution
against the fear of death. But now we do the contrary, and employ
against death the attempt to escape; and to our opinion about it we
employ carelessness, rashness and indifference. These things
Socrates properly used to call "tragic masks"; for as to children
masks appear terrible and fearful from inexperience, we also are
affected in like manner by events for no other reason than children
are by masks. For what is a child? Ignorance. What is a child? Want of
knowledge. For when a child knows these things, he is in no way
inferior to us. What is death? A "tragic mask." Turn it and examine
it. See, it does not bite. The poor body must be separated from the
spirit either now or later, as it was separated from it before. Why,
then, are you troubled, if it be separated now? for if it is not
separated now, it will be separated afterward. Why? That the period of
the universe may be completed, for it has need of the present, and
of the future, and of the past. What is pain? A mask. Turn it and
examine it. The poor flesh is moved roughly, then, on the contrary,
smoothly. If this does not satisfy you, the door is open: if it
does, bear. For the door ought to be open for all occasions; and so we
have no trouble.
What then is the fruit of these opinions? It is that which ought
to he the most noble and the most becoming to those who are really
educated, release from perturbation, release from fear, freedom. For
in these matters we must not believe the many, who say that free
persons only ought to be educated, but we should rather believe the
philosophers, who say that the educated only are free.
-- Epictetus, The Discourses (55-135b.c.)
