Russian education in Estonia a barrier to a strong and cohesive society
Opinion 30 Dec 2009 Laas Leivatprint edition
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In a recent article in Postimees, Sergei Metlev, an executive member of the Open Republic organization, explains why uncertainty and insecurity influence the goals and ambitions of Russian youth in Estonia. The following are his perceptions of the situation.
The underlying cause is the education provided by Russian schools in Estonia. A 2008 study conducted by the Open Society Institute indicated that 19% of Russian youth aged 15-29 want to leave Estonia permanently. Of this, 45% want to reside concurrently abroad as well as in Estonia, but only 5% in Russia while 40% prefer residence elsewhere. This goal is equally large among Estonian youth, but a 2007 study showed that 71% still desire strong ties to Estonia.
When expatriate Estonians return to their homeland they have a definite attachment to the land and people of their heritage – a motivation lacking in Russian youth.
Graduates of Russian high schools, deficient in the Estonian language and unable to adjust within Estonian society feel just as out of place as they would in a foreign country. To them an Estonian university would seem equally strange, as would one abroad.
Those graduates who can’t leave Estonia or compete for university entrance elsewhere have been the source of unskilled labour. Estonia has all but discarded its image of cheap labour and a return to the old status quo would be a mistake.
Most of the problem associated with poor Estonian language skills, a weak sense of citizenship and a lack of vital information can be blamed on Russian education in Estonia. Last year the graduates from Russian schools achieved approximately 15% lower grades than their equivalents in Estonian language schools. Russian graduates taking state exams in the Estonian language gained an average of 56 points, 4 points lower than the required 60 for graduate certificates – a serious barrier to entering university.
Even offering 60% of the Russian high school program in Estonian would help addressing the discrepancy and would aid Russian graduates in coping within Estonian society and in being better informed.
Russian schools are weak in instilling feelings of citizenship, which is necessary in developing a sense of social responsibility. Currently, many Russian students believe that the War of Independence was a fiction. Open discussion of the war or responsible citizenship is practically not permitted. The notion of citizenship should be also taught to Russian language teachers.
Russian schools require more openness and flexibility. Bringing bilingual teachers into the system would inject new energy.
A boost in the increase of student self realization skills could be achieved through discussion groups leading to student representation on pedagogical councils where democratic traditions preside. Initiative is often punished or severely regimented.
All youth, including Russians, are Estonia’s strategic resource. Without educated and tolerant Russian youth our nationality problems will simply be put off into the future.
miercuri, 30 decembrie 2009
marți, 29 decembrie 2009
Petru Bogatu: Top 10 predicţii pentru 2010
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1. Alegeri anticipate nu vor avea loc.
Deşi toată lumea s-a resemnat şi consideră că la anul va trebui să iasă la votare, nu-i exclus ca un nou scrutin să nu fie convocat până la finele lui 2010. În cazul unei reforme constituţionale, alegerile vor fi amânate.
2. Referendum în prima jumătate a anului.
Electoratul, totuşi, va fi chemat la urne în 2010. Numai că nu pentru noi alegeri parlamentare, ci pentru a amenda legea supremă. Reformarea constituţiei se impune imperios, de aceea plebescitul este inevitabil şi va avea loc, pesemne, la primăvară.
3. Va fi ales preşedintele republicii.
În 2010, se pare că Republica Moldova va avea, în sfârşit, un nou şef al statului. Acesta va fi Marian Lupu, care, în urma amendamentelor la Constituţie, va fi ales, probabil, de Parlament cu o majoritate simplă de voturi.
4. PD se va constitui în cel mai puternic partid de pe stânga eşichierului.
Democraţii se vor întări considerabil. Mai cu seamă, după alegerea lui Marian Lupu în funcţia de preşedinte al republicii. PD va absorbi o parte semnificativă a electoratului şi a structurilor PCRM şi PSD. Totodată, consolidarea Partidului Democrat şi poziţia avansată a lui Marian Lupu vor alimenta tensiuni în AIE.
5. Pe stânga va apărea un nou partid, iar politicieni precum Vladimir Ţurcan sau Victor Stepaniuc vor fi foarte activi în viitorul sezon politic.
Spre sfârşit de an, se va accentua tentaţia constituirii unei noi coaliţii de centru-stânga fără comunişti, dar şi fără liberali-conservatori.
6. PLDM va deveni cel mai popular partid.
În cazul în care Guvernul Filat va ţine cadenţa, liberal-democraţii vor asimila importante segmente anterior nealiniate electoral ale societăţii. În acelaşi timp, consolidarea PLDM şi PD nu va cimenta AIE, ci din contra, va periclita unitatea coaliţiei de guvernământ.
7. Influenţa PCRM se va diminua atât în Parlament, cât şi în societate.
Fosta formaţiune de guvernământ se va dezintegra treptat de-a lungul întregului an politic, dar mai ales după referendumul constituţional. Vor continua retragerile din partid atât pe plan naţional, cât şi în provincie. O parte din deputaţiii comunişti vor deveni independenţi, alţii vor adera la grupări politice de stânga sau chiar de dreapta.
8. Vladimir Voronin, în urma scăderii propriei popularităţi, dar şi a problemelor cu care se va confrunta formaţiunea, va pierde controlul absolut asupra PCRM.
9. Se vor derula primele anchete de corupţie.
10. Republica Moldova va începe să întrunească, treptat, condiţiile unui stat cu presă liberă.
Piaţa audiovizualului va fi dominată de 3-4 televiziuni cu acoperire cvasinaţională, care vor oferi o autentică platformă de dezbatere.
1. Alegeri anticipate nu vor avea loc.
Deşi toată lumea s-a resemnat şi consideră că la anul va trebui să iasă la votare, nu-i exclus ca un nou scrutin să nu fie convocat până la finele lui 2010. În cazul unei reforme constituţionale, alegerile vor fi amânate.
2. Referendum în prima jumătate a anului.
Electoratul, totuşi, va fi chemat la urne în 2010. Numai că nu pentru noi alegeri parlamentare, ci pentru a amenda legea supremă. Reformarea constituţiei se impune imperios, de aceea plebescitul este inevitabil şi va avea loc, pesemne, la primăvară.
3. Va fi ales preşedintele republicii.
În 2010, se pare că Republica Moldova va avea, în sfârşit, un nou şef al statului. Acesta va fi Marian Lupu, care, în urma amendamentelor la Constituţie, va fi ales, probabil, de Parlament cu o majoritate simplă de voturi.
4. PD se va constitui în cel mai puternic partid de pe stânga eşichierului.
Democraţii se vor întări considerabil. Mai cu seamă, după alegerea lui Marian Lupu în funcţia de preşedinte al republicii. PD va absorbi o parte semnificativă a electoratului şi a structurilor PCRM şi PSD. Totodată, consolidarea Partidului Democrat şi poziţia avansată a lui Marian Lupu vor alimenta tensiuni în AIE.
5. Pe stânga va apărea un nou partid, iar politicieni precum Vladimir Ţurcan sau Victor Stepaniuc vor fi foarte activi în viitorul sezon politic.
Spre sfârşit de an, se va accentua tentaţia constituirii unei noi coaliţii de centru-stânga fără comunişti, dar şi fără liberali-conservatori.
6. PLDM va deveni cel mai popular partid.
În cazul în care Guvernul Filat va ţine cadenţa, liberal-democraţii vor asimila importante segmente anterior nealiniate electoral ale societăţii. În acelaşi timp, consolidarea PLDM şi PD nu va cimenta AIE, ci din contra, va periclita unitatea coaliţiei de guvernământ.
7. Influenţa PCRM se va diminua atât în Parlament, cât şi în societate.
Fosta formaţiune de guvernământ se va dezintegra treptat de-a lungul întregului an politic, dar mai ales după referendumul constituţional. Vor continua retragerile din partid atât pe plan naţional, cât şi în provincie. O parte din deputaţiii comunişti vor deveni independenţi, alţii vor adera la grupări politice de stânga sau chiar de dreapta.
8. Vladimir Voronin, în urma scăderii propriei popularităţi, dar şi a problemelor cu care se va confrunta formaţiunea, va pierde controlul absolut asupra PCRM.
9. Se vor derula primele anchete de corupţie.
10. Republica Moldova va începe să întrunească, treptat, condiţiile unui stat cu presă liberă.
Piaţa audiovizualului va fi dominată de 3-4 televiziuni cu acoperire cvasinaţională, care vor oferi o autentică platformă de dezbatere.
Nicolae Negru: Nu i se face dreptate presei, aninându-i-se medalii la gât
Nicolae Negru: Nu i se face dreptate presei, aninându-i-se medalii la gât
Decorarea cu înalte distincţii de stat a unor jurnalişti compromite mai degrabă decât încurajează independenţa presei, libertatea de exprimare, susţine Nicolae Negru.
Moldova Azi, 29 decembrie 2009, 15:03
Comentarii
"Poate, fără să vrea, dl Ghimpu a comis un gest care se potriveşte mai curând unei dorinţe de înregimentare a presei, nu de stimulare a independenţei acesteia", susţine publicistul Nicolae Negru.
Referindu-se la recenta decorare a 12 jurnalişti cu "Ordinul Republicii" şi a unui ziarist cu Ordinul de Onoare, publicistul Nicolae Negru notează într-un comentariu în "Jurnal de Chişinău" că decorarea „cu hurta" transmite un mesaj deosebit de cel dacă ar fi fost decorată doar o singură persoană.
Astfel, în opinia lui Nicolae Negru, este deranjantă motivaţia politică, ideologică, a gestului prezidenţial. "Impresia de care nu se poate face abstracţie este că dl Ghimpu a premiat nu prestaţia jurnalistică în sine (din acest punct de vedere, repetăm, unora dintre cei decoraţi li s-ar putea reproşa câte ceva), ci, mai întâi de toate, poziţia lor politică din ultima vreme", susţine Negru.
Potrivit lui Nicolae Negru, conştient sau poate inconştient, Ghimpu păşeşte pe urmele lui Vladimir Voronin. "Ghimpu nu s-a gândit la dezvoltarea presei independente, ci la „răsplătirea" unui anumit fel de atitudine. Modul în care a procedat preşedintele interimar ridică semne de întrebare asupra imparţialităţii şi obiectivităţii sale, compromite mai degrabă decât încurajează independenţa presei, libertatea de exprimare. Cel puţin, pune jurnaliştii decoraţi, presa în general, într-o situaţie incomodă, jenantă", susţine Negru.
"Tentaţia de a se comporta ca un Moş Crăciun vine de la modelul paternalist, sovietic, de comportament, în timp ce un preşedinte modern este mai curând un „coordonator", un factor de echilibru şi de „inspiraţie"", menţionează publicistul.
Potrivit lui Nicolae Negru, stimularea presei independente ar necesita în primul rând o altă abordare, axată mai mult pe problemele şi instituţiile media, şi mai puţin pe persoane.
"Nu i se face dreptate presei, aninându-i-se medalii la gât. Dacă se vorbeşte despre „afirmarea libertăţii de exprimare", despre „promovarea democraţiei şi a valorilor general" de ce a fost ignorată activitatea unor ONG-uri care au efectuat monitorizări, au făcut în permanenţă declaraţii, au scris rapoarte... Mă refer la CJI, API, APEL, UJM, Acces Info, care au fost supuse unor presiuni enorme, defăimării şi hărţuirii...", mai notează Nicolae Negru.
Amintim că luni, patru din cei 12 jurnalişti decoraţi cu Ordinul Republicii şi-au exprimat "gratitudinea pentru înalta apreciere a activităţii în domeniul jurnalisticii într-o perioadă îndelungată şi plină de evenimente cruciale pentru destinele ţării şi ale poporului".
Totodată, jurnaliştii au declarat că vor rămâne în continuare fideli politicilor editoriale pe care le-au promovat până în prezent şi au spus că nu vor ezita să critice guvernarea actuală şi oricare alta, în momentul când vor descoperi greşeli, abateri sau derogări de la funcţia de promotori ai interesului public.
"Noi interpretăm decretul prezidenţial privind decorarea unui grup mare de jurnalişti din presa independentă cu cea mai înaltă distincţie a statului nu numai ca un gest de apreciere, ci şi ca unul recuperatoriu, în raport cu perioada când valorile se stabileau pe criterii de partid, clientelare. Iată de ce, considerăm o practică reprobabilă acordarea de distincţii selectiv pe principii de algoritm politic sau în funcţie de simpatii personale, fapt ce diminuează şi discreditează nu numai valoarea distincţiilor ca atare, dar şi instituţia statului", se arată în declaraţia semnată de Valeriu Saharneanu, Constantin Tănase, Petru Bogatu şi Val Butnaru.
Decretul privind decorarea jurnaliştilor a fost emis de preşedintele interimar Mihai Ghimpu la 24 decembrie 2009.
Astfel, de „Ordinul Republicii" s-au învrednicit Petru Bogatu, editorialist la ziarul „Jurnal de Chişinău", Lorena Bogza, realizatoare a emisiunii „În PROfunzime" la postul de televiziune PRO TV Chişinău, Vasile Botnaru, director al Biroului de la Chişinău al postului de radio „Europa Liberă", Valeriu Butnaru, preşedinte al „Jurnal Trust Media", Dumitru Ciubaşenco, redactor-şef al ziarului „Panorama", Corina Fusu, preşedintă a Comisiei cultură, educaţie, cercetare, tineret, sport şi mass-media a Parlamentului, Anatolie Golea, director general al „Analitic Media grup" - TV7, Aneta Grosu, redactor-şef al săptămânalului independent de investigaţii „Ziarul de Gardă", Valeriu Saharneanu, preşedinte al Uniunii Jurnaliştilor din Republica Moldova, Constantin Tănase, director al cotidianului naţional independent „Timpul", Valentina Ursu, reporter la Biroul de la Chişinău al postului de radio „Europa Liberă", Elena Zamura, redactor-şef al ziarului „Alianţa „Moldova Noastră".
Cu „Ordinul de Onoare" a fost decorat Nicolae Dabija, redactor-şef al săptămânalului „Literatura şi Arta".
Distincţiile au fost conferite în semn de înaltă apreciere a meritelor deosebite în afirmarea libertăţii de exprimare, pentru contribuţie substanţială la procesul de renaştere naţională şi la promovarea democraţiei şi a valorilor general umane
Decorarea cu înalte distincţii de stat a unor jurnalişti compromite mai degrabă decât încurajează independenţa presei, libertatea de exprimare, susţine Nicolae Negru.
Moldova Azi, 29 decembrie 2009, 15:03
Comentarii
"Poate, fără să vrea, dl Ghimpu a comis un gest care se potriveşte mai curând unei dorinţe de înregimentare a presei, nu de stimulare a independenţei acesteia", susţine publicistul Nicolae Negru.
Referindu-se la recenta decorare a 12 jurnalişti cu "Ordinul Republicii" şi a unui ziarist cu Ordinul de Onoare, publicistul Nicolae Negru notează într-un comentariu în "Jurnal de Chişinău" că decorarea „cu hurta" transmite un mesaj deosebit de cel dacă ar fi fost decorată doar o singură persoană.
Astfel, în opinia lui Nicolae Negru, este deranjantă motivaţia politică, ideologică, a gestului prezidenţial. "Impresia de care nu se poate face abstracţie este că dl Ghimpu a premiat nu prestaţia jurnalistică în sine (din acest punct de vedere, repetăm, unora dintre cei decoraţi li s-ar putea reproşa câte ceva), ci, mai întâi de toate, poziţia lor politică din ultima vreme", susţine Negru.
Potrivit lui Nicolae Negru, conştient sau poate inconştient, Ghimpu păşeşte pe urmele lui Vladimir Voronin. "Ghimpu nu s-a gândit la dezvoltarea presei independente, ci la „răsplătirea" unui anumit fel de atitudine. Modul în care a procedat preşedintele interimar ridică semne de întrebare asupra imparţialităţii şi obiectivităţii sale, compromite mai degrabă decât încurajează independenţa presei, libertatea de exprimare. Cel puţin, pune jurnaliştii decoraţi, presa în general, într-o situaţie incomodă, jenantă", susţine Negru.
"Tentaţia de a se comporta ca un Moş Crăciun vine de la modelul paternalist, sovietic, de comportament, în timp ce un preşedinte modern este mai curând un „coordonator", un factor de echilibru şi de „inspiraţie"", menţionează publicistul.
Potrivit lui Nicolae Negru, stimularea presei independente ar necesita în primul rând o altă abordare, axată mai mult pe problemele şi instituţiile media, şi mai puţin pe persoane.
"Nu i se face dreptate presei, aninându-i-se medalii la gât. Dacă se vorbeşte despre „afirmarea libertăţii de exprimare", despre „promovarea democraţiei şi a valorilor general" de ce a fost ignorată activitatea unor ONG-uri care au efectuat monitorizări, au făcut în permanenţă declaraţii, au scris rapoarte... Mă refer la CJI, API, APEL, UJM, Acces Info, care au fost supuse unor presiuni enorme, defăimării şi hărţuirii...", mai notează Nicolae Negru.
Amintim că luni, patru din cei 12 jurnalişti decoraţi cu Ordinul Republicii şi-au exprimat "gratitudinea pentru înalta apreciere a activităţii în domeniul jurnalisticii într-o perioadă îndelungată şi plină de evenimente cruciale pentru destinele ţării şi ale poporului".
Totodată, jurnaliştii au declarat că vor rămâne în continuare fideli politicilor editoriale pe care le-au promovat până în prezent şi au spus că nu vor ezita să critice guvernarea actuală şi oricare alta, în momentul când vor descoperi greşeli, abateri sau derogări de la funcţia de promotori ai interesului public.
"Noi interpretăm decretul prezidenţial privind decorarea unui grup mare de jurnalişti din presa independentă cu cea mai înaltă distincţie a statului nu numai ca un gest de apreciere, ci şi ca unul recuperatoriu, în raport cu perioada când valorile se stabileau pe criterii de partid, clientelare. Iată de ce, considerăm o practică reprobabilă acordarea de distincţii selectiv pe principii de algoritm politic sau în funcţie de simpatii personale, fapt ce diminuează şi discreditează nu numai valoarea distincţiilor ca atare, dar şi instituţia statului", se arată în declaraţia semnată de Valeriu Saharneanu, Constantin Tănase, Petru Bogatu şi Val Butnaru.
Decretul privind decorarea jurnaliştilor a fost emis de preşedintele interimar Mihai Ghimpu la 24 decembrie 2009.
Astfel, de „Ordinul Republicii" s-au învrednicit Petru Bogatu, editorialist la ziarul „Jurnal de Chişinău", Lorena Bogza, realizatoare a emisiunii „În PROfunzime" la postul de televiziune PRO TV Chişinău, Vasile Botnaru, director al Biroului de la Chişinău al postului de radio „Europa Liberă", Valeriu Butnaru, preşedinte al „Jurnal Trust Media", Dumitru Ciubaşenco, redactor-şef al ziarului „Panorama", Corina Fusu, preşedintă a Comisiei cultură, educaţie, cercetare, tineret, sport şi mass-media a Parlamentului, Anatolie Golea, director general al „Analitic Media grup" - TV7, Aneta Grosu, redactor-şef al săptămânalului independent de investigaţii „Ziarul de Gardă", Valeriu Saharneanu, preşedinte al Uniunii Jurnaliştilor din Republica Moldova, Constantin Tănase, director al cotidianului naţional independent „Timpul", Valentina Ursu, reporter la Biroul de la Chişinău al postului de radio „Europa Liberă", Elena Zamura, redactor-şef al ziarului „Alianţa „Moldova Noastră".
Cu „Ordinul de Onoare" a fost decorat Nicolae Dabija, redactor-şef al săptămânalului „Literatura şi Arta".
Distincţiile au fost conferite în semn de înaltă apreciere a meritelor deosebite în afirmarea libertăţii de exprimare, pentru contribuţie substanţială la procesul de renaştere naţională şi la promovarea democraţiei şi a valorilor general umane
The Code of Broadcasters' Conduct, Moldova, English
L-am tradus in engleza si l-am pus poate mai are nevoie cineva
APPROVED
by BCC Decision no. 127 of 26.12.2007
Chairman ________________Gheorghe GORINCIOI
The Code
of Broadcasters' Conduct
Taking into account the major role of radio and TV broadcasting in forming the personal attitudes of citizens, the public opinion and in developing the democratic society, the ethical responsibility of the broadcasters to citizens and society in general;
Convinced that the freedom of expression and the insurance of the unrestricted access to any piece of information of public interest represent essential foundations of a democratic society and taking into account that exerting these rights entails duties and responsibilities;
Conscious of the responsibility of the broadcasters to air program services matching the norms of professional ethics and of the need to protect the linguistic and national-cultural heritage;
Preoccupied with the need to insure the minors' protection and conscious that the freedom of expression cannot prejudice one's dignity, honor, private life or the right to one's own image;
We, the broadcasters from Moldova, commit to strictly observe the following conduct rules and norms in our professional activity.
Chapter I
Informing Justly, Fully, Adequately and Political-Social Pluralism
Art. 1. The Broadcasters have the primordial duty to tell the truth, regardless of the consequences it may have on them, this obligation pours from the constitutional right of the public to be informed justly, fully and adequately. In the wake of this right the broadcasters are bound to communicate only facts fully checked.
Art. 2. The Broadcasters have the obligation to make a clear distinction between facts and opinions, so as not to confuse them. In reporting facts and opinions, the journalists shall act by good faith and shall not present their opinions as facts.
Art. 3. The information presented in news and current affairs programs should ground on facts and data the truthfulness of which can be established by corresponding verification methods.
Art. 4. Informing on issues of public interest, politics, economy, society and culture shall pursue to insure the impartiality, the balance and shall favor the free formation of opinions, by presenting the views of all the parties involved and, if it is the case, the main opposing views.
Art. 5. The Broadcasters shall specify the political capacity of the people expressing opinions in news programs or debates.
Art. 6. The Broadcasters are obliged to offer the right to response and rectification to any natural or legal entity the rights or the legitimate interests of which are harmed in a broadcast by presenting untrue or inexact facts. The Broadcasters may not offer the right to response for expressing opinions or value judgments, in case response to response is asked for or in the case the audiatur et altera pars principle is observed.
Art. 7. The Broadcaster intentionally distorting the information, making groundless accusations, using photographs, video footage and other sources without authorization, or slandering, commits professional deviations of maximum severity.
Chapter II
Public Interests and Respect for Human Rights
Art. 8. In the understanding of this Code, any local or national problems, facts or events bearing significance for the life of the community are considered of justified public interest.
Art. 9. The Broadcasters are obliged to observe the principle of presumption of innocence and shall not allow for bringing accusations without offering the accused the possibility to say his/her viewpoint.
Art. 10. Any person has the right to have his/her private and family life observed, as well as his/her domicile and correspondence. The Broadcasters shall not broadcast information about the private and family life of a person, without his/her agreement, except for meeting the conditions for the cases of justified public interest. The information about the address of a person or of his/her family and their telephone numbers shall not be revealed without their agreement.
Art. 11. The Broadcasters are bound to take into account the legitimate interests of minors. They shall protect the identity of minors involved in infractions, as victims or authors, except for the situation when the public interest requires that they are identified, or following the express request of parents or of their legal representatives, viewing to protect the minor's superior interest.
Art. 12. The identity of the victims of accidents, calamities, infractions, especially of the victims of sexual aggressions, shall not be revealed, except for the situation when they agree or when major public interest prevails. The vulnerable people (sick, disabled, refugees, etc.) enjoy the same approach.
Art. 13. The Broadcasters are bound not to discriminate anyone because of racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, age, sexual orientation or disability reasons and not to instigate to hatred and violence when reporting facts or expressing opinions.
Art. 14. The Broadcasters have the obligation to warn the public, in case of broadcasting scenes of violence with possible negative emotional impact and to avoid the repeated presentation of footage. Images presenting executions, killed people of volunteers to die, regardless of their reasons, are broadcast only in well-justified cases.
Art. 15. In cases of the kidnap or the highjack, the Broadcasters shall ensure that the broadcast footage does not prejudice the efforts made to solve them and do not jeopardize the lives of people involved.
Art. 16. Anyone has the right to his/her own image. In case, in broadcasts, accusations are brought to a person related to illegal or immoral facts or behavior, they shall be supported by proofs, and the accused persons have the right to intervene to express their viewpoint. If the accusations are brought by the broadcaster, it is bound to ask for the viewpoint of the incriminated person.
Art. 17. The program producers have the obligation not to allow the invitees to use licentious language or to instigate to violence against other people. Any pejorative reference in the address of the elderly or the disabled, or placing them in ridiculous or humiliating situations are forbidden in broadcasts.
Art. 18. Anyone has the right to have his/her intimacy respected in difficult moments, as an irreparable loss or misfortune. In case of human sufferance, of natural disasters, accidents or acts of violence, the Broadcasters have the obligation not to get unduly involved in the private life.
Art. 19. The Broadcasters shall not air images of a person in the situation of a victim, without his/her agreement and without the agreement of the family of the person without discernment or dead. In the cases of witnesses at committing infractions, upon their request, the footage shall be broadcast by ensuring the full protection of their identity.
Chapter III
Gathering Information and Protecting Sources
Art. 20. The Broadcasters shall obtain information overtly, transparently and legally. When asking for information, the journalist is bound to introduce himself/herself, to name the broadcaster he/she represents and to tell the informing person that the audio and/or video recordings and his/her words may be broadcast, except for the cases of gathering information confidential or inaccessible officially.
Art. 21. The Broadcasters shall not broadcast images or sounds recorded with hidden microphones or cameras, except for the cases in which the materials obtained so could not have been made in natural conditions, and their content represents a justified interest for the public. This fact should be explicitly mentioned when broadcasting the information.
Art. 22. Broadcasting recordings of telephone conversations or (excerpts from) correspondence having reached the broadcasters is allowed in case it meets needs of national security, of public order or it ensures the prevention of punishable acts, it proves the commission of an offense or it represents justified public interest.
Art. 23. The Broadcasters have the obligation to keep the confidentiality of the sources asking to have their anonymity preserved or of the sources the unveiling of which can jeopardize their life, physical or psychical integrity, their place of work or other legitimate interests.
Art. 24. In case of presenting audiovisual materials coming from sources outside the office, this shall be specified. Exception shall be made as to the audiovisual materials coming from news agencies.
Chapter IV
Journalist's Independence and Broadcaster's Responsibility
Art. 25. Total transparency shall exist in broadcasting entities as to the ownership over and the management of the broadcaster, so that the citizens shall clearly know the identity of owners and the level of their economic employment in the entity.
Art. 26. The radio and TV journalist has the right to the conscience clause. He has the right to refuse any journalistic action against the principles of the journalistic ethics or against his/her own convictions. This freedom derives from the journalist's obligation to inform the public, with good faith.
Art. 27. The radio and TV journalist does not carry out instructions on the part of authorities, private structures or persons, but subordinates only to the executive management of the employing broadcasting entity.
Art. 28. Using the status of a radio/TV journalist to gain personal benefits or for third parties runs counter the ethical norms and is unacceptable.
Art. 29. In exercising the profession and in the relations with public authorities, political parties, civil society organizations, or with commercial entities, the radio and TV journalist is forbidden to conclude agreements which may affect his/her impartiality or independence.
Art. 30. The radio and TV journalist shall not accept advantages or privileges which may compromise his/her integrity and the image of the broadcaster.
Art. 31. The radio and TV journalist shall avoid being in a situation of conflict of interests. It is recommended to separate the editorial activities from political and economic activities. In order to avoid the conflicts of interests, it is recommended that the journalist should not be a member of any political party and should not be an informer or an undercover officer of secret services, while exercising his/her job.
Art. 32. The radio and TV journalist has the right to be defended by the employing broadcasting entity, as well as by the professional or trade union association which represents his/her interests against any pressure exerted on him/her, liable to determine a breech of the professional conduct envisaged by this Code.
Art. 33. The radio and TV journalist shall not admit plagiarism, which is one of the largest and most severe deviations from the professional ethics.
Art. 34. The radio and TV journalist shall not cooperate with the Broadcasters which have a tolerant stance concerning the violation of the principles of honest journalism and loyal competition.
Art. 35. The radio and TV journalist shall not offer his/her works to another broadcaster (media outlet) without the consent of the broadcaster's administration.
Art. 35. If a journalist, working as a freelance, offers his/her materials to a number of media, he/she should inform about this the representative of the next broadcaster he/she deals with.
Art. 36. The radio and TV journalist shall keep the confidentiality of the information about the broadcaster, if this does not break the law and this Conduct Code.
Chapter V
Relations among Broadcasters
Art. 37. In their daily relations, the Broadcasters shall keep a balance between fair competition and professional solidarity.
Art. 38. The Broadcasters shall not create obstacles to their colleagues in receiving information and shall not mislead them on purpose.
Art. 39. The Broadcasters shall not settle scores through the agency of waves. Such a behavior damages not only them, but the profession in general.
Art. 40. The Broadcaster is bound to indicate the primary information sources in case it uses data from the work of another author, albeit not quoting, but only adapting the latter one's text.
Art. 41. The Broadcasters can show loyalty and solidarity with one another in any circumstances, and mutual assistance in exercising their professional duties.
APPROVED
by BCC Decision no. 127 of 26.12.2007
Chairman ________________Gheorghe GORINCIOI
The Code
of Broadcasters' Conduct
Taking into account the major role of radio and TV broadcasting in forming the personal attitudes of citizens, the public opinion and in developing the democratic society, the ethical responsibility of the broadcasters to citizens and society in general;
Convinced that the freedom of expression and the insurance of the unrestricted access to any piece of information of public interest represent essential foundations of a democratic society and taking into account that exerting these rights entails duties and responsibilities;
Conscious of the responsibility of the broadcasters to air program services matching the norms of professional ethics and of the need to protect the linguistic and national-cultural heritage;
Preoccupied with the need to insure the minors' protection and conscious that the freedom of expression cannot prejudice one's dignity, honor, private life or the right to one's own image;
We, the broadcasters from Moldova, commit to strictly observe the following conduct rules and norms in our professional activity.
Chapter I
Informing Justly, Fully, Adequately and Political-Social Pluralism
Art. 1. The Broadcasters have the primordial duty to tell the truth, regardless of the consequences it may have on them, this obligation pours from the constitutional right of the public to be informed justly, fully and adequately. In the wake of this right the broadcasters are bound to communicate only facts fully checked.
Art. 2. The Broadcasters have the obligation to make a clear distinction between facts and opinions, so as not to confuse them. In reporting facts and opinions, the journalists shall act by good faith and shall not present their opinions as facts.
Art. 3. The information presented in news and current affairs programs should ground on facts and data the truthfulness of which can be established by corresponding verification methods.
Art. 4. Informing on issues of public interest, politics, economy, society and culture shall pursue to insure the impartiality, the balance and shall favor the free formation of opinions, by presenting the views of all the parties involved and, if it is the case, the main opposing views.
Art. 5. The Broadcasters shall specify the political capacity of the people expressing opinions in news programs or debates.
Art. 6. The Broadcasters are obliged to offer the right to response and rectification to any natural or legal entity the rights or the legitimate interests of which are harmed in a broadcast by presenting untrue or inexact facts. The Broadcasters may not offer the right to response for expressing opinions or value judgments, in case response to response is asked for or in the case the audiatur et altera pars principle is observed.
Art. 7. The Broadcaster intentionally distorting the information, making groundless accusations, using photographs, video footage and other sources without authorization, or slandering, commits professional deviations of maximum severity.
Chapter II
Public Interests and Respect for Human Rights
Art. 8. In the understanding of this Code, any local or national problems, facts or events bearing significance for the life of the community are considered of justified public interest.
Art. 9. The Broadcasters are obliged to observe the principle of presumption of innocence and shall not allow for bringing accusations without offering the accused the possibility to say his/her viewpoint.
Art. 10. Any person has the right to have his/her private and family life observed, as well as his/her domicile and correspondence. The Broadcasters shall not broadcast information about the private and family life of a person, without his/her agreement, except for meeting the conditions for the cases of justified public interest. The information about the address of a person or of his/her family and their telephone numbers shall not be revealed without their agreement.
Art. 11. The Broadcasters are bound to take into account the legitimate interests of minors. They shall protect the identity of minors involved in infractions, as victims or authors, except for the situation when the public interest requires that they are identified, or following the express request of parents or of their legal representatives, viewing to protect the minor's superior interest.
Art. 12. The identity of the victims of accidents, calamities, infractions, especially of the victims of sexual aggressions, shall not be revealed, except for the situation when they agree or when major public interest prevails. The vulnerable people (sick, disabled, refugees, etc.) enjoy the same approach.
Art. 13. The Broadcasters are bound not to discriminate anyone because of racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, age, sexual orientation or disability reasons and not to instigate to hatred and violence when reporting facts or expressing opinions.
Art. 14. The Broadcasters have the obligation to warn the public, in case of broadcasting scenes of violence with possible negative emotional impact and to avoid the repeated presentation of footage. Images presenting executions, killed people of volunteers to die, regardless of their reasons, are broadcast only in well-justified cases.
Art. 15. In cases of the kidnap or the highjack, the Broadcasters shall ensure that the broadcast footage does not prejudice the efforts made to solve them and do not jeopardize the lives of people involved.
Art. 16. Anyone has the right to his/her own image. In case, in broadcasts, accusations are brought to a person related to illegal or immoral facts or behavior, they shall be supported by proofs, and the accused persons have the right to intervene to express their viewpoint. If the accusations are brought by the broadcaster, it is bound to ask for the viewpoint of the incriminated person.
Art. 17. The program producers have the obligation not to allow the invitees to use licentious language or to instigate to violence against other people. Any pejorative reference in the address of the elderly or the disabled, or placing them in ridiculous or humiliating situations are forbidden in broadcasts.
Art. 18. Anyone has the right to have his/her intimacy respected in difficult moments, as an irreparable loss or misfortune. In case of human sufferance, of natural disasters, accidents or acts of violence, the Broadcasters have the obligation not to get unduly involved in the private life.
Art. 19. The Broadcasters shall not air images of a person in the situation of a victim, without his/her agreement and without the agreement of the family of the person without discernment or dead. In the cases of witnesses at committing infractions, upon their request, the footage shall be broadcast by ensuring the full protection of their identity.
Chapter III
Gathering Information and Protecting Sources
Art. 20. The Broadcasters shall obtain information overtly, transparently and legally. When asking for information, the journalist is bound to introduce himself/herself, to name the broadcaster he/she represents and to tell the informing person that the audio and/or video recordings and his/her words may be broadcast, except for the cases of gathering information confidential or inaccessible officially.
Art. 21. The Broadcasters shall not broadcast images or sounds recorded with hidden microphones or cameras, except for the cases in which the materials obtained so could not have been made in natural conditions, and their content represents a justified interest for the public. This fact should be explicitly mentioned when broadcasting the information.
Art. 22. Broadcasting recordings of telephone conversations or (excerpts from) correspondence having reached the broadcasters is allowed in case it meets needs of national security, of public order or it ensures the prevention of punishable acts, it proves the commission of an offense or it represents justified public interest.
Art. 23. The Broadcasters have the obligation to keep the confidentiality of the sources asking to have their anonymity preserved or of the sources the unveiling of which can jeopardize their life, physical or psychical integrity, their place of work or other legitimate interests.
Art. 24. In case of presenting audiovisual materials coming from sources outside the office, this shall be specified. Exception shall be made as to the audiovisual materials coming from news agencies.
Chapter IV
Journalist's Independence and Broadcaster's Responsibility
Art. 25. Total transparency shall exist in broadcasting entities as to the ownership over and the management of the broadcaster, so that the citizens shall clearly know the identity of owners and the level of their economic employment in the entity.
Art. 26. The radio and TV journalist has the right to the conscience clause. He has the right to refuse any journalistic action against the principles of the journalistic ethics or against his/her own convictions. This freedom derives from the journalist's obligation to inform the public, with good faith.
Art. 27. The radio and TV journalist does not carry out instructions on the part of authorities, private structures or persons, but subordinates only to the executive management of the employing broadcasting entity.
Art. 28. Using the status of a radio/TV journalist to gain personal benefits or for third parties runs counter the ethical norms and is unacceptable.
Art. 29. In exercising the profession and in the relations with public authorities, political parties, civil society organizations, or with commercial entities, the radio and TV journalist is forbidden to conclude agreements which may affect his/her impartiality or independence.
Art. 30. The radio and TV journalist shall not accept advantages or privileges which may compromise his/her integrity and the image of the broadcaster.
Art. 31. The radio and TV journalist shall avoid being in a situation of conflict of interests. It is recommended to separate the editorial activities from political and economic activities. In order to avoid the conflicts of interests, it is recommended that the journalist should not be a member of any political party and should not be an informer or an undercover officer of secret services, while exercising his/her job.
Art. 32. The radio and TV journalist has the right to be defended by the employing broadcasting entity, as well as by the professional or trade union association which represents his/her interests against any pressure exerted on him/her, liable to determine a breech of the professional conduct envisaged by this Code.
Art. 33. The radio and TV journalist shall not admit plagiarism, which is one of the largest and most severe deviations from the professional ethics.
Art. 34. The radio and TV journalist shall not cooperate with the Broadcasters which have a tolerant stance concerning the violation of the principles of honest journalism and loyal competition.
Art. 35. The radio and TV journalist shall not offer his/her works to another broadcaster (media outlet) without the consent of the broadcaster's administration.
Art. 35. If a journalist, working as a freelance, offers his/her materials to a number of media, he/she should inform about this the representative of the next broadcaster he/she deals with.
Art. 36. The radio and TV journalist shall keep the confidentiality of the information about the broadcaster, if this does not break the law and this Conduct Code.
Chapter V
Relations among Broadcasters
Art. 37. In their daily relations, the Broadcasters shall keep a balance between fair competition and professional solidarity.
Art. 38. The Broadcasters shall not create obstacles to their colleagues in receiving information and shall not mislead them on purpose.
Art. 39. The Broadcasters shall not settle scores through the agency of waves. Such a behavior damages not only them, but the profession in general.
Art. 40. The Broadcaster is bound to indicate the primary information sources in case it uses data from the work of another author, albeit not quoting, but only adapting the latter one's text.
Art. 41. The Broadcasters can show loyalty and solidarity with one another in any circumstances, and mutual assistance in exercising their professional duties.
sâmbătă, 26 decembrie 2009
Europe Eager to Preserve CFE Treaty
Wade Boese
Many European governments are increasingly anxious about the future of a treaty limiting conventional arms in Europe, but officials say there should be no cause for immediate alarm if Russia suspends implementation of the accord. The Kremlin maintains support for an updated version of that treaty and, in a related move, recently withdrew some Russian military forces from Georgia.
Completed the year before the Soviet Union�s 1991 disintegration, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty placed equal caps on the battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, heavy artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters that the two superpowers and their allies could deploy between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. Aiming to avert massive surprise attacks by either bloc, the treaty limited how many forces could be stationed in central Europe and concentrated in Europe�s northern and southern regions, the so-called flanks.
Referred to as a �cornerstone� of European security, the CFE Treaty is typically hailed for leading to the destruction of more than 60,000 weapons and building confidence and trust among its states-parties through an extensive verification regime. Last May, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice deemed the accord �one of the most important treaties of the 20th century.�
But with the Soviet Union�s collapse and NATO�s expansion to include 10 new members, including former Soviet allies and republics, the treaty�s value has waned in some eyes, most notably in Moscow. Consequently, CFE states-parties in 1999 negotiated an adapted version of the treaty, which among other things replaces the bloc arms limits with national weapons ceilings. (See ACT, November 1999.)
All 30 of the original treaty�s states-parties must ratify the adapted treaty for it to take effect, but only four have done so. The 22 CFE Treaty states-parties that are NATO members have been linking ratification of the adapted treaty to Russia fulfilling military withdrawal commitments regarding Georgia and Moldova. Russia made those pledges at the same summit at which the adapted treaty was completed.
Moscow contends the issues should not be linked and that the adapted treaty must be brought into force as quickly as possible to supplant the original treaty. One of Russia�s many criticisms of the older pact is that four NATO members (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia) are not party to it and therefore do not have any arms limits. The four cannot join the original treaty because it lacks an accession provision, but they will be able to accede to the adapted treaty after it enters into force.
With U.S.-Russian tensions escalating over a Bush administration plan to install strategic anti-missile systems in Europe, Russian President Vladimir Putin in July announced Russia would stop implementing the original CFE Treaty in six months unless NATO addresses Russia�s raft of concerns with the accord. In November, the Russian parliament�s two chambers approved the possible Dec. 12 suspension.
Contemplating a Suspension
The United States and its European allies are urging Russia not to carry out its threat. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier co-authored an article published Oct. 29 in the newspapers Le Figaro and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung warning that �an erosion of the CFE Treaty could spark new arms races and create new lines of confrontation.�
Several government officials from different European states told Arms Control Today in November interviews that the two foreign ministers� concerns were principally of a long-term nature and that NATO members would work to prevent further confrontation even if Russia ceased implementing the CFE Treaty. Almost all of the officials asked not to be named and requested their country not be identified because of the sensitivity of the current situation.
All the officials agreed that the best result would be if Russia opted to �suspend its suspension.� A minority expressed hope that Russia might not act on its threat, but a majority seemed resigned that Moscow would not apply the brakes.
Russia has not been clear on what a suspension might entail. Russian officials have suggested that participation in inspections and data exchanges would cease, but they have not said whether Russia will stop attending meetings of the Joint Consultative Group, the treaty�s Vienna-based forum for implementation discussions. Moreover, Kremlin officials previously stated a suspension would not lead Russia to exceed its limits or redeploy its forces, but more recent media reports have quoted General Yuri Baluyevsky, chief of the general staff, as saying that such options would be kept open.
All the European government officials interviewed by Arms Control Today said NATO members likely would continue initially to provide data exchanges and notifications if Russia stopped. The purpose of doing so, they said, would be to maintain those channels for Russia to resume cooperation and to signal to other countries that one country�s choice not to abide by the treaty does not provide leeway for other states-parties to eschew their legal obligations. Aside from Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Ukraine are the other seven non-NATO CFE states-parties.
The officials generally downplayed possible Russian force buildups, at least in the short term, but acknowledged that concerns are greater for countries nearer Russian borders, such as the three Baltic countries, Norway, and Turkey. Several of the officials stressed, however, that �security cannot be divided.�
A Norwegian official interviewed Nov. 19 by Arms Control Today said his country has both �political and practical reasons� for preserving the CFE framework. But he noted that if Moscow were to increase its forces anywhere, it would most likely be in southern Russia.
A prolonged Russian suspension, some of the officials said, eventually could compel NATO countries to re-evaluate their defense planning. Michael Wyganowski, a former Polish diplomat who worked on CFE Treaty issues and is now executive director of the Washington-based Center for European Policy Analysis, told Arms Control Today Nov. 15 that absent data from Russia and arms limits on Russia, other European military planners would have to alter their �assumptions.� He speculated that if Russia walks away from the CFE regime, it could be a sign that Moscow sees military power playing a bigger role in its policy �toolbox.�
Still, the European government officials stressed the importance of not overreacting to a Russian suspension. In such a case, one official stated there would be no need to �panic,� while another official said it would be crucial to keep the �dialogue and doors open� with Russia.
During the past several months, the United States and its NATO allies have sought to persuade Russia to stave off the suspension, but some say the dialogue has been mostly one way. At multilateral meetings near Berlin and in Paris and at U.S.-Russian bilateral meetings in Moscow and Geneva, U.S. and European officials say the West offers proposals while Russia reiterates its problems and adds to its demands. One European official familiar with the talks told Arms Control Today Nov. 15 that there was �no sign that the Russians were seeking solutions to avoid a suspension.�
Georgia and Moldova
NATO members maintain they have insisted on conditioning the ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty in order to avoid having Georgia and Moldova feel abandoned. Both those governments want Russia�s forces to depart their two territories, and a key principle of the adapted treaty is that foreign deployed troops must have host-state consent.
Russia�s withdrawal from Moldova stalled in 2004, leaving approximately 1,200 Russian troops and about 21,000 metric tons of ammunition behind. But the Kremlin has been slowly reducing its forces in Georgia. In mid-November, Russia finished withdrawing its forces from the second of two bases it promised in 2005 to vacate. (See ACT, July/August 2005.) With that step, only about 200 Russian troops, which Moscow says are peacekeepers, remain in Georgia.
A complicating factor in completing the withdrawals from Georgia and Moldova is that the remaining Russian forces are located in separatist territories. NATO members have volunteered financial assistance to facilitate the withdrawals and proposed that international peacekeepers replace the Russian troops. Moscow has declined these offers, claiming in part that the local ethnic Russian populations would not feel as safe with non-Russian soldiers.
Some NATO members in recent months have suggested starting ratification of the adapted treaty in conjunction with continued Russian withdrawal activities. On Nov. 5, David Kramer, deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, testified to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe that the �goal� would be to �send a constructive signal to Moscow that NATO stands by this treaty.�
The Flanks
Despite its discontent with the original treaty, Moscow also is not entirely happy with the adapted treaty. For instance, Russia dislikes provisions that would allow some NATO members to host temporary deployments of foreign forces above their arms limits.
Another top Kremlin complaint is that the adapted treaty maintains modified versions of the original treaty�s flanks limits on Russia. Those caps constrain the amount of forces that Russia can deploy on its own northern and southern territory, including the unstable Caucasus region. Moscow is calling for the abolishment of its flanks limits.
There is no consensus among NATO members about what should be done with the flanks. But many of the officials interviewed by Arms Control Today said it would be impractical to �open up� the adapted treaty to deal with the flanks before the agreement entered into force. One official volunteered that a potential compromise could be a pledge by NATO to review the flanks issue after the adapted treaty�s entry into force.
Kouchner and Steinmeier appeared to hint at this option. Contending that all the current CFE Treaty disputes cannot be resolved in the short term, the two foreign ministers suggested governments should �proceed on the understanding that even after the entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty, the door will remain open for further amendments.�
Many European governments are increasingly anxious about the future of a treaty limiting conventional arms in Europe, but officials say there should be no cause for immediate alarm if Russia suspends implementation of the accord. The Kremlin maintains support for an updated version of that treaty and, in a related move, recently withdrew some Russian military forces from Georgia.
Completed the year before the Soviet Union�s 1991 disintegration, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty placed equal caps on the battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, heavy artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters that the two superpowers and their allies could deploy between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. Aiming to avert massive surprise attacks by either bloc, the treaty limited how many forces could be stationed in central Europe and concentrated in Europe�s northern and southern regions, the so-called flanks.
Referred to as a �cornerstone� of European security, the CFE Treaty is typically hailed for leading to the destruction of more than 60,000 weapons and building confidence and trust among its states-parties through an extensive verification regime. Last May, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice deemed the accord �one of the most important treaties of the 20th century.�
But with the Soviet Union�s collapse and NATO�s expansion to include 10 new members, including former Soviet allies and republics, the treaty�s value has waned in some eyes, most notably in Moscow. Consequently, CFE states-parties in 1999 negotiated an adapted version of the treaty, which among other things replaces the bloc arms limits with national weapons ceilings. (See ACT, November 1999.)
All 30 of the original treaty�s states-parties must ratify the adapted treaty for it to take effect, but only four have done so. The 22 CFE Treaty states-parties that are NATO members have been linking ratification of the adapted treaty to Russia fulfilling military withdrawal commitments regarding Georgia and Moldova. Russia made those pledges at the same summit at which the adapted treaty was completed.
Moscow contends the issues should not be linked and that the adapted treaty must be brought into force as quickly as possible to supplant the original treaty. One of Russia�s many criticisms of the older pact is that four NATO members (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia) are not party to it and therefore do not have any arms limits. The four cannot join the original treaty because it lacks an accession provision, but they will be able to accede to the adapted treaty after it enters into force.
With U.S.-Russian tensions escalating over a Bush administration plan to install strategic anti-missile systems in Europe, Russian President Vladimir Putin in July announced Russia would stop implementing the original CFE Treaty in six months unless NATO addresses Russia�s raft of concerns with the accord. In November, the Russian parliament�s two chambers approved the possible Dec. 12 suspension.
Contemplating a Suspension
The United States and its European allies are urging Russia not to carry out its threat. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier co-authored an article published Oct. 29 in the newspapers Le Figaro and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung warning that �an erosion of the CFE Treaty could spark new arms races and create new lines of confrontation.�
Several government officials from different European states told Arms Control Today in November interviews that the two foreign ministers� concerns were principally of a long-term nature and that NATO members would work to prevent further confrontation even if Russia ceased implementing the CFE Treaty. Almost all of the officials asked not to be named and requested their country not be identified because of the sensitivity of the current situation.
All the officials agreed that the best result would be if Russia opted to �suspend its suspension.� A minority expressed hope that Russia might not act on its threat, but a majority seemed resigned that Moscow would not apply the brakes.
Russia has not been clear on what a suspension might entail. Russian officials have suggested that participation in inspections and data exchanges would cease, but they have not said whether Russia will stop attending meetings of the Joint Consultative Group, the treaty�s Vienna-based forum for implementation discussions. Moreover, Kremlin officials previously stated a suspension would not lead Russia to exceed its limits or redeploy its forces, but more recent media reports have quoted General Yuri Baluyevsky, chief of the general staff, as saying that such options would be kept open.
All the European government officials interviewed by Arms Control Today said NATO members likely would continue initially to provide data exchanges and notifications if Russia stopped. The purpose of doing so, they said, would be to maintain those channels for Russia to resume cooperation and to signal to other countries that one country�s choice not to abide by the treaty does not provide leeway for other states-parties to eschew their legal obligations. Aside from Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Ukraine are the other seven non-NATO CFE states-parties.
The officials generally downplayed possible Russian force buildups, at least in the short term, but acknowledged that concerns are greater for countries nearer Russian borders, such as the three Baltic countries, Norway, and Turkey. Several of the officials stressed, however, that �security cannot be divided.�
A Norwegian official interviewed Nov. 19 by Arms Control Today said his country has both �political and practical reasons� for preserving the CFE framework. But he noted that if Moscow were to increase its forces anywhere, it would most likely be in southern Russia.
A prolonged Russian suspension, some of the officials said, eventually could compel NATO countries to re-evaluate their defense planning. Michael Wyganowski, a former Polish diplomat who worked on CFE Treaty issues and is now executive director of the Washington-based Center for European Policy Analysis, told Arms Control Today Nov. 15 that absent data from Russia and arms limits on Russia, other European military planners would have to alter their �assumptions.� He speculated that if Russia walks away from the CFE regime, it could be a sign that Moscow sees military power playing a bigger role in its policy �toolbox.�
Still, the European government officials stressed the importance of not overreacting to a Russian suspension. In such a case, one official stated there would be no need to �panic,� while another official said it would be crucial to keep the �dialogue and doors open� with Russia.
During the past several months, the United States and its NATO allies have sought to persuade Russia to stave off the suspension, but some say the dialogue has been mostly one way. At multilateral meetings near Berlin and in Paris and at U.S.-Russian bilateral meetings in Moscow and Geneva, U.S. and European officials say the West offers proposals while Russia reiterates its problems and adds to its demands. One European official familiar with the talks told Arms Control Today Nov. 15 that there was �no sign that the Russians were seeking solutions to avoid a suspension.�
Georgia and Moldova
NATO members maintain they have insisted on conditioning the ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty in order to avoid having Georgia and Moldova feel abandoned. Both those governments want Russia�s forces to depart their two territories, and a key principle of the adapted treaty is that foreign deployed troops must have host-state consent.
Russia�s withdrawal from Moldova stalled in 2004, leaving approximately 1,200 Russian troops and about 21,000 metric tons of ammunition behind. But the Kremlin has been slowly reducing its forces in Georgia. In mid-November, Russia finished withdrawing its forces from the second of two bases it promised in 2005 to vacate. (See ACT, July/August 2005.) With that step, only about 200 Russian troops, which Moscow says are peacekeepers, remain in Georgia.
A complicating factor in completing the withdrawals from Georgia and Moldova is that the remaining Russian forces are located in separatist territories. NATO members have volunteered financial assistance to facilitate the withdrawals and proposed that international peacekeepers replace the Russian troops. Moscow has declined these offers, claiming in part that the local ethnic Russian populations would not feel as safe with non-Russian soldiers.
Some NATO members in recent months have suggested starting ratification of the adapted treaty in conjunction with continued Russian withdrawal activities. On Nov. 5, David Kramer, deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, testified to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe that the �goal� would be to �send a constructive signal to Moscow that NATO stands by this treaty.�
The Flanks
Despite its discontent with the original treaty, Moscow also is not entirely happy with the adapted treaty. For instance, Russia dislikes provisions that would allow some NATO members to host temporary deployments of foreign forces above their arms limits.
Another top Kremlin complaint is that the adapted treaty maintains modified versions of the original treaty�s flanks limits on Russia. Those caps constrain the amount of forces that Russia can deploy on its own northern and southern territory, including the unstable Caucasus region. Moscow is calling for the abolishment of its flanks limits.
There is no consensus among NATO members about what should be done with the flanks. But many of the officials interviewed by Arms Control Today said it would be impractical to �open up� the adapted treaty to deal with the flanks before the agreement entered into force. One official volunteered that a potential compromise could be a pledge by NATO to review the flanks issue after the adapted treaty�s entry into force.
Kouchner and Steinmeier appeared to hint at this option. Contending that all the current CFE Treaty disputes cannot be resolved in the short term, the two foreign ministers suggested governments should �proceed on the understanding that even after the entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty, the door will remain open for further amendments.�
Russia, Islam, and the West
Russia, Islam, and the West
Dr. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis
December 4, 2007
As last Sunday’s farcical elections highlight the Western apathy and shyness in front of the rising forces of Russian totalitarianism, we are rather left with the impression that England and America may have even wished the victory of United Russia, the party supported by the Kremlin dictator.
The reasons are not limited within the bilateral context, West vs. Russia, that the Anglo-Saxon powers want to preserve in order to avoid a more complicated, triangular relationship USA – European Union – Russia. The reasons of the Western indifference for the diffusion and implementation of Democracy, freedom and Human Rights in Russia pertain also to Islam. This has little to do with the Muslims included with Russia’s borders and their eventual manipulation by the Western powers (in what would be the closest parallel to Afghanistan’s Taliban). It mostly hinges on the fact that sizeable parts of the Islamic World occupy territories that are either Oil and Gas rich or critical for Oil and Gas transportation. And these territories are adjacent to Russia, at its southern flank……
Apparently provocative Western attitudes towards Russia
The Western world has proved to be a politically inconsistent, ideologically disparate, and morally perverse complex of conflicting economic interests. They all emanate from two diametrically opposed circles of behind-the-scenes power that coexisted for many long centuries, plunging Europe first and the entire world at a later stage into ceaseless wars.
The Western world’s expansion spread problems rather than solved issues. Since the collapse of the East European Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union, 16 – 18 years have passed, and they are a very long period for intentions and interests to be manifested clearly. If many believed in 1990 that there was a genuine Western interest in the oppressed peoples of the European East, Central Asia and Siberia, as well as in the satellite countries, namely Angola, Vietnam, Mongolia, ‘Ethiopia’ and Cuba, few are left with this impression today.
Already in the days of Gorbachev, a genuine interest was expressed by the last Soviet leader for a Russian participation in what he called as ‘the Common European House’. However, since the middle 90s the term was methodically buried, as the Western attitude towards Russia was rather reminiscent of robbery; Bulgaria should join NATO, Estonia should join the EU, Ukraine should separate completely, and the Russian natural resources should be sold as cheapest as possible.
The West never demonstrated a really serious interest to reach out to the Russian democrats, to extend a real concern for the various non Russian oppressed nations, and to integrate Russia in a decent way in the NATO, the WEU, and the EU. As a matter of fact, Russia has been treated far worse than Turkey in this regard. The Western attitude vis-à-vis Russia has been as biased as in the case of Turkey’s Kurds. It is definitely mendacious and hypocritical to show an interest in the use of Kurdish in Turkey’s Primary and Secondary Education without also demonstrating an equivalent interest in the use of Breton, Alsatian, Langue d’ Oc, Corsican, Basque (Euskara), and Catalan in France.
In the case of Russia, even this sort of interest for the rights of the minorities was not shown by the Western democrats and liberals! Russia was presumed to be a permanently despotic and totalitarian realm, and it was dealt with in this way even at a moment the overall situation had not yet degraded to the extent it has today. Russia was undesired within the EU, not by the majority of the European peoples but by a secretive Anglo-French Directoire that exercises an ominous influence over the economically strong but politically dwarf Germany, thus imposing its biased strategies on all the rest.
In the case of the Russian Oil and Gas resources US – UK – Dutch Oil and Gas companies attempted to display an attitude already recorded vis-à-vis the Kuwaiti, Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari lewd thugs who impersonate the World History’s most vulgar, ignorant and pathetic pseudo-noblesse. Finally, NATO strategists thought possible to annex Russia in they same way they may record the adhesion of Macedonia.
Improper Western attitudes triggered Russian inflexibility
One should be mad to think that all this would have no effect; finally, it let average Russians believe more easily the anti-Western rhetoric expressed by various Russian politicians as a political tool useful to anyone wishing to become a popular leader. The pathetic Western attitude, multiplied in its manifestations, was so overt, so overwhelming, and so exasperating that even the stupidest politician in the world, if trying to rise to power in Russia, would understand that it is to his benefit to maintain and help deteriorate.
In a way there was not a single possible mistake that the Western administrations failed to commit when dealing with early post-Soviet Russia. Why?
The answer is simple; the Western administrations and diplomats failed to conceive in its correct dimensions the new world that emanated out of the economic – political collapse of the Soviet world; the European Directory failed to see that, under terms of fair treatment, Russia would be able to grant Europe otherwise unachievable dimensions of world power. Even worse (because it reveals a quantitative approach to historical phenomena evaluation), the NATO strategists concluded that they had won a military victory over the Soviet block – and nothing is more untrue than this aberration.
Russian Neo-totalitarianism: not an epiphenomenon of the Soviet Era
The next mistake the Western elites make as regards Russia and the rise of the totalitarianism is that they view it as an epiphenomenon of the Soviet expansionism whereas it is not; plenty of attributes of the Cold War are not there anymore. The worst of all is the total absence of the Nash equilibrium that characterized the theory of deterrence and the doctrine of mutual assured destruction.
The rise of religious fundamentalism amalgamated with Messianism and Christian Orthodox eschatology cancels any further Russian ascription to the Cold War theoretical arsenal. Strong Russian presence in Jerusalem is necessary for the Russian Millenarists, and this has to do with the elimination of their ulcerous opponents, the Zionists, the Evangelicals and the Catholics.
In other words, the West does not understand that this time an uncontrolled, uncontained, alienated and exasperated Russia will hit. This is very clear and in all fronts; Russia will cause serious troubles and divisions among states of the EU, using the energy weapon. One should expect a determined Russian revanche in this regard.
Dr. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis
December 4, 2007
As last Sunday’s farcical elections highlight the Western apathy and shyness in front of the rising forces of Russian totalitarianism, we are rather left with the impression that England and America may have even wished the victory of United Russia, the party supported by the Kremlin dictator.
The reasons are not limited within the bilateral context, West vs. Russia, that the Anglo-Saxon powers want to preserve in order to avoid a more complicated, triangular relationship USA – European Union – Russia. The reasons of the Western indifference for the diffusion and implementation of Democracy, freedom and Human Rights in Russia pertain also to Islam. This has little to do with the Muslims included with Russia’s borders and their eventual manipulation by the Western powers (in what would be the closest parallel to Afghanistan’s Taliban). It mostly hinges on the fact that sizeable parts of the Islamic World occupy territories that are either Oil and Gas rich or critical for Oil and Gas transportation. And these territories are adjacent to Russia, at its southern flank……
Apparently provocative Western attitudes towards Russia
The Western world has proved to be a politically inconsistent, ideologically disparate, and morally perverse complex of conflicting economic interests. They all emanate from two diametrically opposed circles of behind-the-scenes power that coexisted for many long centuries, plunging Europe first and the entire world at a later stage into ceaseless wars.
The Western world’s expansion spread problems rather than solved issues. Since the collapse of the East European Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union, 16 – 18 years have passed, and they are a very long period for intentions and interests to be manifested clearly. If many believed in 1990 that there was a genuine Western interest in the oppressed peoples of the European East, Central Asia and Siberia, as well as in the satellite countries, namely Angola, Vietnam, Mongolia, ‘Ethiopia’ and Cuba, few are left with this impression today.
Already in the days of Gorbachev, a genuine interest was expressed by the last Soviet leader for a Russian participation in what he called as ‘the Common European House’. However, since the middle 90s the term was methodically buried, as the Western attitude towards Russia was rather reminiscent of robbery; Bulgaria should join NATO, Estonia should join the EU, Ukraine should separate completely, and the Russian natural resources should be sold as cheapest as possible.
The West never demonstrated a really serious interest to reach out to the Russian democrats, to extend a real concern for the various non Russian oppressed nations, and to integrate Russia in a decent way in the NATO, the WEU, and the EU. As a matter of fact, Russia has been treated far worse than Turkey in this regard. The Western attitude vis-à-vis Russia has been as biased as in the case of Turkey’s Kurds. It is definitely mendacious and hypocritical to show an interest in the use of Kurdish in Turkey’s Primary and Secondary Education without also demonstrating an equivalent interest in the use of Breton, Alsatian, Langue d’ Oc, Corsican, Basque (Euskara), and Catalan in France.
In the case of Russia, even this sort of interest for the rights of the minorities was not shown by the Western democrats and liberals! Russia was presumed to be a permanently despotic and totalitarian realm, and it was dealt with in this way even at a moment the overall situation had not yet degraded to the extent it has today. Russia was undesired within the EU, not by the majority of the European peoples but by a secretive Anglo-French Directoire that exercises an ominous influence over the economically strong but politically dwarf Germany, thus imposing its biased strategies on all the rest.
In the case of the Russian Oil and Gas resources US – UK – Dutch Oil and Gas companies attempted to display an attitude already recorded vis-à-vis the Kuwaiti, Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari lewd thugs who impersonate the World History’s most vulgar, ignorant and pathetic pseudo-noblesse. Finally, NATO strategists thought possible to annex Russia in they same way they may record the adhesion of Macedonia.
Improper Western attitudes triggered Russian inflexibility
One should be mad to think that all this would have no effect; finally, it let average Russians believe more easily the anti-Western rhetoric expressed by various Russian politicians as a political tool useful to anyone wishing to become a popular leader. The pathetic Western attitude, multiplied in its manifestations, was so overt, so overwhelming, and so exasperating that even the stupidest politician in the world, if trying to rise to power in Russia, would understand that it is to his benefit to maintain and help deteriorate.
In a way there was not a single possible mistake that the Western administrations failed to commit when dealing with early post-Soviet Russia. Why?
The answer is simple; the Western administrations and diplomats failed to conceive in its correct dimensions the new world that emanated out of the economic – political collapse of the Soviet world; the European Directory failed to see that, under terms of fair treatment, Russia would be able to grant Europe otherwise unachievable dimensions of world power. Even worse (because it reveals a quantitative approach to historical phenomena evaluation), the NATO strategists concluded that they had won a military victory over the Soviet block – and nothing is more untrue than this aberration.
Russian Neo-totalitarianism: not an epiphenomenon of the Soviet Era
The next mistake the Western elites make as regards Russia and the rise of the totalitarianism is that they view it as an epiphenomenon of the Soviet expansionism whereas it is not; plenty of attributes of the Cold War are not there anymore. The worst of all is the total absence of the Nash equilibrium that characterized the theory of deterrence and the doctrine of mutual assured destruction.
The rise of religious fundamentalism amalgamated with Messianism and Christian Orthodox eschatology cancels any further Russian ascription to the Cold War theoretical arsenal. Strong Russian presence in Jerusalem is necessary for the Russian Millenarists, and this has to do with the elimination of their ulcerous opponents, the Zionists, the Evangelicals and the Catholics.
In other words, the West does not understand that this time an uncontrolled, uncontained, alienated and exasperated Russia will hit. This is very clear and in all fronts; Russia will cause serious troubles and divisions among states of the EU, using the energy weapon. One should expect a determined Russian revanche in this regard.
THE JOURNALISTS UNION FROM MOLDOVA EXPLANATORY REPORT by Valeriu Saharneanu,
THE JOURNALISTS UNION FROM MOLDOVA
EXPLANATORY REPORT
The national liberation movement in the Republic of Moldova, a former Soviet republic, started in 1987. It was stimulated by the attempt of the Kremlin staff to reform the communist party and the Soviet socialism. “Perestroika and glasnost” however gave a stir to the huge mass of problems the Soviet society suffered from. The fear of reprisals inhibited, for decades, the people’s discontent with the genocide practiced by the Bolshevik government against the people locked by force into the Soviet Union. The little dose of freedom through which the Kremlin wanted to make up the hideous face “of the empire of evil” caused the implosion which later crushed it. From 1989 through, the most important objective of the Liberation Movement were achieved: the right to the Romanian language, to the Latin script, to independence and sovereignty. The want for freedom made hundreds of thousands of people get to streets to claim their right to self-determination, legally accomplished in 1991. It was in those processes that the Moldovan journalistic guild grew up.
In 1990, the Journalists Union from Moldova declared its independence from the Soviet structure ideologically subordinated to the communist party of the USSR. The journalists working in state-owned media adopted rule3s to transform them into public services. From 1991 to 1994, the first private media appeared, as the state broadcaster worked as a public national broadcasting entity. Scared by the Europeanization processes Moldova was passing through, and especially by the possibility to join the motherland, Romania, Russia started, in 1992, a five-month war, ending in the occupation of Moldova’s eastern area, on the left bank of the Dniester river. The occupation is still there. The war was lost because Moldova was, at that time, totally covered by the propaganda potential of the media from the Russian Federation. As Moldova joined the Council of Europe in 1995 and it recognized the European Convention of Human Rights, prerequisites for the promotion and development of free media appeared in the country.
Namely from 1995 through 2001, under the coverage and with the participation of the subdivisions of the Council of Europe, the Journalists Union from Moldova essentially contributed to shaping and strengthening the democratic principles of work of the free press. Namely then, the principles of the relationships between the free media and journalists with the state and society were shaped. The Journalists Union drafted and submitted the Parliament a National Concept on promoting and developing the free media, which was adopted in February, 1999. Holding a permanent dialogue with the ruling structures, the Journalists Union participated in drafting laws on the public broadcasting, on the local media, critically debated on the adoption of the Press Law. Following mutually accepted commitments with the state structures pursuing to avoid excessive regulation, the Journalists Union, in cooperation with the Media Division of the Council of Europe, drafted and adopted the Ethical Code of the Journalist from the Republic of Moldova, co-signed by all the media-dealing NGOs. At monthly sittings of the National Press Club, organized by the Journalists Union and having politicians, the country’s leaders, parliamentarians and different personalities from the civil society as invitees, hot issues related to the construction of a democratic society were debated. All the activities started from the prerequisite that, without free media, built to function on democratic principles, Moldova had no chances to assert itself as a democratic state.
In order to strengthen the journalistic guild, to prepare them to integrate into the European professional sector, the Journalists Union organized, till 2001, tens of seminars, symposiums, work-shops, conferences, congresses. They were attended by journalists from all the types of media, by national and international experts from Germany, France, Switzerland, Great Britain, Norway, Poland, Romania. From 1995 through 2001, the Journalists Union, in its capacity of a representative organization of professional journalists managed to assert itself within society as one of the most active and most present in the professional and civil life of Moldova, as an organization of public reference and as an important professional authority. The membership in the Union meant then and still means for journalists the recognition of their certain professional skills, drawing the esteem and respect of colleague and society. At the same time, this capacity also obliges to responsibility and correctitude.
The economic crisis caused by the ruble’s crash in August 1998 hit the former Soviet republics and undermined Moldova’s democratic development. The Communists Party speculated on the hardships of the crisis and climbed to power in February 2001, wagging populist and extremist slogans. The attempt by the Journalists Union to continue the dialogue with the Communist government to further strengthen the position of the free press failed. The Communists’ offer left no double interpretations summing up to a single solution: the institutional and ideological drafting of the Journalists Union as was the model of the Soviet practice. Evidently, the Journalists Union could not accept that offer, what unleashed a campaign of marginalizing and denigrating the institution. First, the Communist government ordered the creation of a parallel entity with the pretentious name “the league of professional journalists”, logistically and financially supported by the power. Right the president of the country – also the leader of the Communists Party and a former general of Soviet militsia -- attended its first inauguration sitting. The message was clear: abandoning the Journalists Union and the unconditional enrollment into “the league” that some journalists correctly nicknamed as “the league of communist journalists.”
Economic and financial attacks followed. As a result, the Journalists Union was abusively deprived of property, even the news conference room in the premises of the Press House. The attacks were accompanied by intimidations against the Union’s president and members. Ordered by the government, the Union’s basic organizations, territorial branches and the branches in state company Teleradio Moldova, official news agency Moldpres, in all the media outlets that were swallowed by the ruling Communist party were forbidden. The campaign pursued to decrease the Union’s impact over media employees, and society, too. However, the Journalists Union was among the organizers and actively participated in all the key protests manifestations unleashed against censorship at the state institution Teleradio Moldova in 2002. The Union stood by the journalists from that Company during the entire period of 4 months of strike against massive dismissals on political criteria unleashed by the Communist power in July-November 2004. The forces were unequal, and the power managed to take under its full control this important institution of public information in 2006.
With the same abusive, anti-constitutional methods, the communist rule took hold of most of state-owned newspapers, of a series of TV channels and radio stations. Through the Broadcasting Coordinating Council, the national regulating authority, the communist power compelled other media to abstain from airing news, commentaries, not to organize debates, programs of political dialogue and interactive programs with the public, leaving no public space for debates. The Journalists Union protested and held a series of public debates in open air, from December 10, 2007 through 10 December, 2008, on Sundays, attended by tens of thousands of citizens, journalists, politicians, opinion directors. From 2001to 2009, the Journalists Union has been the resistance center of the Moldovan professional journalists against the attempts of the Communist power to take under its total control the people’s information sources and thus to break Moldova’s pursuit of democracy. The apex of this resistance was the year 2009, which saw two electoral races, especially aggressive. Tens of probes and trials were started against independent media and journalists, including against the leaders of the Journalists Union. However, but a small number of independent media outlets managed to resist and informed their audiences about the most important events and phenomena which were hidden by state media and the Communist-backed outlets. These journalists, members of the Journalists Union, these media reported, promptly and boldly, about the murders committed by police, about the involvement of the Communist and state officials in devastating the buildings of the Parliament and Presidency on April 7 , 2009, about the high-scale fraud of the parliamentary elections of 5 April.
Due to the intransigent position of the independent media, due to the courage of the journalists, who did not hesitate to inform the people truthfully and fully, under the threat of death, the democratic forces, joined in an Alliance for European Integration won the 29 July elections, in Moldova. This event opens a new perspective for Moldova’s further fate. Indubitably, this prospect is linked, as can be read from the name of the ruling Alliance, to the European values. Hopefully, a very tragic period from Moldova’s recent history ends here. Tragic, because under the communist rule, Moldova missed the European integration train, taken by the Baltic and East-European countries, being turned into the poorest, most corrupt and miserable country on this continent and not only. General Voronin’s Communist regime, backed by high political and also religious circles from Moscow, tried to isolate Moldova from democratic Europe with a wall of hatred and ignorance. The attempt however failed because the Moldovan journalists, few in number in this struggle, but helped by the big force of the truth, did their duty as their profession required.
The Moldovan Journalists Union gets out from this period of the Communist revanche lasting for almost a decade. It gets out without properties, without sources of subsistence, truncated and decimated, only with its name in store. It’s true, with a stainless name, a name bringing more value to the heritage of professional dignity and verticality, kept with so much sacrifice. It’s also true that, having such a heritage it’s much easier to start re-building the organization and guild, which was shattered and set on barricades by the communist regime.
These days, the Journalists Union has resumed its dialogue with the new democratic authorities viewing the reform of the sector. The reform pursues to set the foundations of a new stage in the development of free media, interrupted by the communist rule. But it’s not possible to insure efficient and rapid reconstruction without the sympathetic support on behalf of the fellow-journalists from the European countries, without the support of the International and European Federation of Journalists.
Using this occasion, here in Europe’s heart, the Journalists Union from Moldova calls to the solidarity and help on all the unions and associations of journalists from Europe.
Valeriu Saharneanu,
Journalists Union from Moldova
7 - 9 November, 2009
BERLIN
EXPLANATORY REPORT
The national liberation movement in the Republic of Moldova, a former Soviet republic, started in 1987. It was stimulated by the attempt of the Kremlin staff to reform the communist party and the Soviet socialism. “Perestroika and glasnost” however gave a stir to the huge mass of problems the Soviet society suffered from. The fear of reprisals inhibited, for decades, the people’s discontent with the genocide practiced by the Bolshevik government against the people locked by force into the Soviet Union. The little dose of freedom through which the Kremlin wanted to make up the hideous face “of the empire of evil” caused the implosion which later crushed it. From 1989 through, the most important objective of the Liberation Movement were achieved: the right to the Romanian language, to the Latin script, to independence and sovereignty. The want for freedom made hundreds of thousands of people get to streets to claim their right to self-determination, legally accomplished in 1991. It was in those processes that the Moldovan journalistic guild grew up.
In 1990, the Journalists Union from Moldova declared its independence from the Soviet structure ideologically subordinated to the communist party of the USSR. The journalists working in state-owned media adopted rule3s to transform them into public services. From 1991 to 1994, the first private media appeared, as the state broadcaster worked as a public national broadcasting entity. Scared by the Europeanization processes Moldova was passing through, and especially by the possibility to join the motherland, Romania, Russia started, in 1992, a five-month war, ending in the occupation of Moldova’s eastern area, on the left bank of the Dniester river. The occupation is still there. The war was lost because Moldova was, at that time, totally covered by the propaganda potential of the media from the Russian Federation. As Moldova joined the Council of Europe in 1995 and it recognized the European Convention of Human Rights, prerequisites for the promotion and development of free media appeared in the country.
Namely from 1995 through 2001, under the coverage and with the participation of the subdivisions of the Council of Europe, the Journalists Union from Moldova essentially contributed to shaping and strengthening the democratic principles of work of the free press. Namely then, the principles of the relationships between the free media and journalists with the state and society were shaped. The Journalists Union drafted and submitted the Parliament a National Concept on promoting and developing the free media, which was adopted in February, 1999. Holding a permanent dialogue with the ruling structures, the Journalists Union participated in drafting laws on the public broadcasting, on the local media, critically debated on the adoption of the Press Law. Following mutually accepted commitments with the state structures pursuing to avoid excessive regulation, the Journalists Union, in cooperation with the Media Division of the Council of Europe, drafted and adopted the Ethical Code of the Journalist from the Republic of Moldova, co-signed by all the media-dealing NGOs. At monthly sittings of the National Press Club, organized by the Journalists Union and having politicians, the country’s leaders, parliamentarians and different personalities from the civil society as invitees, hot issues related to the construction of a democratic society were debated. All the activities started from the prerequisite that, without free media, built to function on democratic principles, Moldova had no chances to assert itself as a democratic state.
In order to strengthen the journalistic guild, to prepare them to integrate into the European professional sector, the Journalists Union organized, till 2001, tens of seminars, symposiums, work-shops, conferences, congresses. They were attended by journalists from all the types of media, by national and international experts from Germany, France, Switzerland, Great Britain, Norway, Poland, Romania. From 1995 through 2001, the Journalists Union, in its capacity of a representative organization of professional journalists managed to assert itself within society as one of the most active and most present in the professional and civil life of Moldova, as an organization of public reference and as an important professional authority. The membership in the Union meant then and still means for journalists the recognition of their certain professional skills, drawing the esteem and respect of colleague and society. At the same time, this capacity also obliges to responsibility and correctitude.
The economic crisis caused by the ruble’s crash in August 1998 hit the former Soviet republics and undermined Moldova’s democratic development. The Communists Party speculated on the hardships of the crisis and climbed to power in February 2001, wagging populist and extremist slogans. The attempt by the Journalists Union to continue the dialogue with the Communist government to further strengthen the position of the free press failed. The Communists’ offer left no double interpretations summing up to a single solution: the institutional and ideological drafting of the Journalists Union as was the model of the Soviet practice. Evidently, the Journalists Union could not accept that offer, what unleashed a campaign of marginalizing and denigrating the institution. First, the Communist government ordered the creation of a parallel entity with the pretentious name “the league of professional journalists”, logistically and financially supported by the power. Right the president of the country – also the leader of the Communists Party and a former general of Soviet militsia -- attended its first inauguration sitting. The message was clear: abandoning the Journalists Union and the unconditional enrollment into “the league” that some journalists correctly nicknamed as “the league of communist journalists.”
Economic and financial attacks followed. As a result, the Journalists Union was abusively deprived of property, even the news conference room in the premises of the Press House. The attacks were accompanied by intimidations against the Union’s president and members. Ordered by the government, the Union’s basic organizations, territorial branches and the branches in state company Teleradio Moldova, official news agency Moldpres, in all the media outlets that were swallowed by the ruling Communist party were forbidden. The campaign pursued to decrease the Union’s impact over media employees, and society, too. However, the Journalists Union was among the organizers and actively participated in all the key protests manifestations unleashed against censorship at the state institution Teleradio Moldova in 2002. The Union stood by the journalists from that Company during the entire period of 4 months of strike against massive dismissals on political criteria unleashed by the Communist power in July-November 2004. The forces were unequal, and the power managed to take under its full control this important institution of public information in 2006.
With the same abusive, anti-constitutional methods, the communist rule took hold of most of state-owned newspapers, of a series of TV channels and radio stations. Through the Broadcasting Coordinating Council, the national regulating authority, the communist power compelled other media to abstain from airing news, commentaries, not to organize debates, programs of political dialogue and interactive programs with the public, leaving no public space for debates. The Journalists Union protested and held a series of public debates in open air, from December 10, 2007 through 10 December, 2008, on Sundays, attended by tens of thousands of citizens, journalists, politicians, opinion directors. From 2001to 2009, the Journalists Union has been the resistance center of the Moldovan professional journalists against the attempts of the Communist power to take under its total control the people’s information sources and thus to break Moldova’s pursuit of democracy. The apex of this resistance was the year 2009, which saw two electoral races, especially aggressive. Tens of probes and trials were started against independent media and journalists, including against the leaders of the Journalists Union. However, but a small number of independent media outlets managed to resist and informed their audiences about the most important events and phenomena which were hidden by state media and the Communist-backed outlets. These journalists, members of the Journalists Union, these media reported, promptly and boldly, about the murders committed by police, about the involvement of the Communist and state officials in devastating the buildings of the Parliament and Presidency on April 7 , 2009, about the high-scale fraud of the parliamentary elections of 5 April.
Due to the intransigent position of the independent media, due to the courage of the journalists, who did not hesitate to inform the people truthfully and fully, under the threat of death, the democratic forces, joined in an Alliance for European Integration won the 29 July elections, in Moldova. This event opens a new perspective for Moldova’s further fate. Indubitably, this prospect is linked, as can be read from the name of the ruling Alliance, to the European values. Hopefully, a very tragic period from Moldova’s recent history ends here. Tragic, because under the communist rule, Moldova missed the European integration train, taken by the Baltic and East-European countries, being turned into the poorest, most corrupt and miserable country on this continent and not only. General Voronin’s Communist regime, backed by high political and also religious circles from Moscow, tried to isolate Moldova from democratic Europe with a wall of hatred and ignorance. The attempt however failed because the Moldovan journalists, few in number in this struggle, but helped by the big force of the truth, did their duty as their profession required.
The Moldovan Journalists Union gets out from this period of the Communist revanche lasting for almost a decade. It gets out without properties, without sources of subsistence, truncated and decimated, only with its name in store. It’s true, with a stainless name, a name bringing more value to the heritage of professional dignity and verticality, kept with so much sacrifice. It’s also true that, having such a heritage it’s much easier to start re-building the organization and guild, which was shattered and set on barricades by the communist regime.
These days, the Journalists Union has resumed its dialogue with the new democratic authorities viewing the reform of the sector. The reform pursues to set the foundations of a new stage in the development of free media, interrupted by the communist rule. But it’s not possible to insure efficient and rapid reconstruction without the sympathetic support on behalf of the fellow-journalists from the European countries, without the support of the International and European Federation of Journalists.
Using this occasion, here in Europe’s heart, the Journalists Union from Moldova calls to the solidarity and help on all the unions and associations of journalists from Europe.
Valeriu Saharneanu,
Journalists Union from Moldova
7 - 9 November, 2009
BERLIN
Jurnalistii agreati de putere dupa alegerile din 2009
Mai jos vedeti lista jurnalistilor carora le va fi greu sa critice actuala putere, chiar daca Tanase si Val Butnaru au spus inainte de 5 aprilie, 2009 , ca o vor face.
Apropo, ati observat ca Timpul a inceput sa semene tot mai mult cu Moldova Suverana, numai ca invers?
De „Ordinul Republicii" s-au învrednicit Petru Bogatu, editorialist la ziarul „Jurnal de Chişinău", Lorena Bogza, realizatoare a emisiunii „În PROfunzime" la postul de televiziune PRO TV Chişinău, Vasile Botnaru, director al Biroului de la Chişinău al postului de radio „Europa Liberă", Valeriu Butnaru, preşedinte al „Jurnal Trust Media", Dumitru Ciubaşenco, redactor-şef al ziarului „Panorama", Corina Fusu, preşedintă a Comisiei cultură, educaţie, cercetare, tineret, sport şi mass-media a Parlamentului, Anatolie Golea, director general al „Analitic Media grup" - TV7, Aneta Grosu, redactor-şef al săptămânalului independent de investigaţii „Ziarul de Gardă", Valeriu Saharneanu, preşedinte al Uniunii Jurnaliştilor din Republica Moldova, Constantin Tănase, director al cotidianului naţional independent „Timpul", Valentina Ursu, reporter la Biroul de la Chişinău al postului de radio „Europa Liberă", Elena Zamura, redactor-şef al ziarului „Alianţa „Moldova Noastră".
Cu „Ordinul de Onoare" a fost decorat Nicolae Dabija, redactor-şef al săptămânalului „Literatura şi Arta".
Distincţiile au fost conferite în semn de înaltă apreciere a meritelor deosebite în afirmarea libertăţii de exprimare, pentru contribuţie substanţială la procesul de renaştere naţională şi la promovarea democraţiei şi a valorilor general umane.
Apropo, ati observat ca Timpul a inceput sa semene tot mai mult cu Moldova Suverana, numai ca invers?
De „Ordinul Republicii" s-au învrednicit Petru Bogatu, editorialist la ziarul „Jurnal de Chişinău", Lorena Bogza, realizatoare a emisiunii „În PROfunzime" la postul de televiziune PRO TV Chişinău, Vasile Botnaru, director al Biroului de la Chişinău al postului de radio „Europa Liberă", Valeriu Butnaru, preşedinte al „Jurnal Trust Media", Dumitru Ciubaşenco, redactor-şef al ziarului „Panorama", Corina Fusu, preşedintă a Comisiei cultură, educaţie, cercetare, tineret, sport şi mass-media a Parlamentului, Anatolie Golea, director general al „Analitic Media grup" - TV7, Aneta Grosu, redactor-şef al săptămânalului independent de investigaţii „Ziarul de Gardă", Valeriu Saharneanu, preşedinte al Uniunii Jurnaliştilor din Republica Moldova, Constantin Tănase, director al cotidianului naţional independent „Timpul", Valentina Ursu, reporter la Biroul de la Chişinău al postului de radio „Europa Liberă", Elena Zamura, redactor-şef al ziarului „Alianţa „Moldova Noastră".
Cu „Ordinul de Onoare" a fost decorat Nicolae Dabija, redactor-şef al săptămânalului „Literatura şi Arta".
Distincţiile au fost conferite în semn de înaltă apreciere a meritelor deosebite în afirmarea libertăţii de exprimare, pentru contribuţie substanţială la procesul de renaştere naţională şi la promovarea democraţiei şi a valorilor general umane.
miercuri, 23 decembrie 2009
Statute of the National Public Audiovisual Institution – the Company “Teleradio – Moldova”
http://www.osce.org/documents/mm/2007/07/28332_en.pdf
Code of Professional Ethics for Journalists
MOLDOVA
Code of Professional Ethics
for Journalists
(Adopted by the Journalists' Union of Moldova,
ujm@moldnet.md)
1. Under all circumstances, the journalist is under the obligation to act according to the ethical principles set forth in this code—this is an indispensable condition for a person to be a journalist.
2. The journalist will be aware of the fact that information and communication have an extremely important role in forming citi-zens’ personal attitudes and developing society towards democ-racy, and that the mass media have a high ethical responsibility to citizens, while journalism involves rights and obligations, re-sponsibilities and liberties. Information is a fundamental right held by the citizen, who also has the related right to have that information passed on to him accurately and honestly, and when it comes to opinion, without external interference from public authorities or from the private sector.
3. The journalist will observe the laws of his country, but in all issues regarding the observation of professional obligations the journalist will acknowledge the exclusive jurisdiction of his col-leagues and reject any attempt from his government or anyone else to apply pressure or interfere.
4. The main principle on which to base any ethical judgement passed on the journalist will be the clear separation of informa-tion from opinion, so as to make it impossible to mistake one for another.
5. The journalist will publish only the current information of which he is sure and whose origin he knows very well. Presen-tation, description and narration should be impartial. The jour-nalist will not resort to illegal and dishonest ways of obtaining information. The journalist will acknowledge the right of indi-viduals and legal entities not to provide information and not to answer his questions, except for the cases when the inter-viewee is under a legal obligation to provide information.
If a journalist is certain that he has made a mistake by publish-ing false or manipulated information, then he is under the obli-gation to remedy such mistake by the same written and/or broadcast means that have been used for the publication of that information. When necessary, the journalist should apologise through the media outlet which employs him.
6. Although opinions are subjective by their mere nature, and therefore should not be subject to scrutiny as to accuracy re-garding reality, they should nevertheless be subject to honesty and ethics when they are expressed.
7. The journalist ought not to accept, either directly or indirectly, any compensation or fees from third parties for the publication of any kind of stories or opinions.
8. The journalist will be responsible by his name and reputation for the truthfulness of every piece of information, for the objec-tivity of every opinion published under his signature, pen-name, or anonymously but to which he has agreed. No one has the right to prevent a journalist from not signing a piece of informa-tion or opinion which was distorted, even if partially, against his will.
9. The journalist will observe professional secrecy regarding the source of information obtained on confidential terms. No one has the right to force a journalist to disclose his source. The right to anonymity can be broken only in exceptional circum-stances, when there is a suspicion that the source distorted the truth knowingly, as well as when the disclosure of the source’s name is the only way to avoid serious and imminent damage to other people. The journalist is under the obligation not to dis-close the opinions expressed by his interviewees if the inter-viewees asked him so.
10. The journalist will respect the honour and reputation of the individuals who become objects of his professional interest. He will refrain from any contemptuous remarks or comments re-garding the race, nationality, colour, confession, social origin or sex, as well as regarding a physical disability or illness affecting the person he reports on. The journalist will refrain from publish-ing such information except for the cases when such circum-stances are directly linked to the story. The journalist is under the obligation to avoid using insulting expressions which may cause moral or physical injury. When dealing with any kind of issues the journalist will protect democratic values by peaceful means and in the spirit of tolerance, will oppose violence, hate speech and confrontation, will oppose any discrimination based on culture, sex or creed.
11. In the information and opinions he presents, a journalist should observe the presumption of innocence until the court is-sues a verdict. In stories from court rooms, the journalist will re-frain from mentioning the names of friends or relatives of people under investigation, except for the cases when this is required for an objective description of the case. The journalist will also refrain from mentioning the name of a crime victim and publish-ing information which may lead to the disclosure of the victim’s identity.
12. The journalist will respect the right of individuals to privacy. Public officers are also justified in not disclosing their private life except for the cases when their private life may affect their pub-lic activity. The restrictions on interference will also be strictly observed in relation to persons working in medical or similar in-stitutions.
13. The journalist will be aware that his status is incompatible with governmental, legislative or legal service, as well as with positions of leadership in political parties and other politically-oriented organisations. The journalist will be aware that his pro-fessional activity will be suspended as soon as he takes a weapon in hand.
14. The journalist ought not to follow his profession with the main objective of acquiring prestige and personal influence. The journalist will see as undignified the situation when he would use his reputation, authority, as well as his professional possi-bilities in order to publish commercial information or advertising, especially when the nature of such information is not obvious in the form in which it is published. The mere combination of jour-nalistic and advertising activities is deemed inadmissible from an ethical point of view.
15. The journalist should not use for personal ends or in the in-terest of people in close acquaintance with him, confidential in-formation that he possesses by virtue of his profession.
16. The journalist will value and protect the professional rights of fellow journalists, and will observe the laws of fair competi-tion. The journalist will respect, and will make others respect, the copyright in any creative area. Plagiarism is inadmissible. Every time a journalist will use, in any way, work done by other journalists, he will refer to the author’s name.
17. During his contacts with public authorities or various busi-nesses in the course of carrying out his professional duties, the journalist ought to avoid any complicity that may affect his inde-pendence and impartiality.
18. The journalist will reject any assignment if it might lead him into violating any of the principles set in this Code of Ethics.
19. The journalist will make use of, and protect, his right to use all guarantees provided by the civil and criminal legislation of the Republic of Moldova in law bodies and in others.
20. The present code of ethical principles may serve as argu-mentative basis in cases reviewed by law bodies and other bod-ies, in any litigation which involves the journalist himself or the product of his professional activity.
21. In order to render applicable the principles set forth in the present Code of Professional Ethics journalists should create a monitoring mechanism. Such a mechanism is represented by the National Professional Ethics Board for Journalists, which has its own Rules of Operation, consists of famous journalists, is elected by the Convention of the Journalists’ Union of Moldova, and signed by representatives from all the media or-ganisations in the Republic of Moldova, being thereby recog-nised by all the journalists working in the media throughout the country.
22. Should there be a corresponding request from law bodies or other bodies, the National Ethics Board may issue examination resolutions for a litigation involving the journalist himself or the product of his professional activity, and is the only expert body in this area of professional self-regulation.
Code of Professional Ethics
for Journalists
(Adopted by the Journalists' Union of Moldova,
ujm@moldnet.md)
1. Under all circumstances, the journalist is under the obligation to act according to the ethical principles set forth in this code—this is an indispensable condition for a person to be a journalist.
2. The journalist will be aware of the fact that information and communication have an extremely important role in forming citi-zens’ personal attitudes and developing society towards democ-racy, and that the mass media have a high ethical responsibility to citizens, while journalism involves rights and obligations, re-sponsibilities and liberties. Information is a fundamental right held by the citizen, who also has the related right to have that information passed on to him accurately and honestly, and when it comes to opinion, without external interference from public authorities or from the private sector.
3. The journalist will observe the laws of his country, but in all issues regarding the observation of professional obligations the journalist will acknowledge the exclusive jurisdiction of his col-leagues and reject any attempt from his government or anyone else to apply pressure or interfere.
4. The main principle on which to base any ethical judgement passed on the journalist will be the clear separation of informa-tion from opinion, so as to make it impossible to mistake one for another.
5. The journalist will publish only the current information of which he is sure and whose origin he knows very well. Presen-tation, description and narration should be impartial. The jour-nalist will not resort to illegal and dishonest ways of obtaining information. The journalist will acknowledge the right of indi-viduals and legal entities not to provide information and not to answer his questions, except for the cases when the inter-viewee is under a legal obligation to provide information.
If a journalist is certain that he has made a mistake by publish-ing false or manipulated information, then he is under the obli-gation to remedy such mistake by the same written and/or broadcast means that have been used for the publication of that information. When necessary, the journalist should apologise through the media outlet which employs him.
6. Although opinions are subjective by their mere nature, and therefore should not be subject to scrutiny as to accuracy re-garding reality, they should nevertheless be subject to honesty and ethics when they are expressed.
7. The journalist ought not to accept, either directly or indirectly, any compensation or fees from third parties for the publication of any kind of stories or opinions.
8. The journalist will be responsible by his name and reputation for the truthfulness of every piece of information, for the objec-tivity of every opinion published under his signature, pen-name, or anonymously but to which he has agreed. No one has the right to prevent a journalist from not signing a piece of informa-tion or opinion which was distorted, even if partially, against his will.
9. The journalist will observe professional secrecy regarding the source of information obtained on confidential terms. No one has the right to force a journalist to disclose his source. The right to anonymity can be broken only in exceptional circum-stances, when there is a suspicion that the source distorted the truth knowingly, as well as when the disclosure of the source’s name is the only way to avoid serious and imminent damage to other people. The journalist is under the obligation not to dis-close the opinions expressed by his interviewees if the inter-viewees asked him so.
10. The journalist will respect the honour and reputation of the individuals who become objects of his professional interest. He will refrain from any contemptuous remarks or comments re-garding the race, nationality, colour, confession, social origin or sex, as well as regarding a physical disability or illness affecting the person he reports on. The journalist will refrain from publish-ing such information except for the cases when such circum-stances are directly linked to the story. The journalist is under the obligation to avoid using insulting expressions which may cause moral or physical injury. When dealing with any kind of issues the journalist will protect democratic values by peaceful means and in the spirit of tolerance, will oppose violence, hate speech and confrontation, will oppose any discrimination based on culture, sex or creed.
11. In the information and opinions he presents, a journalist should observe the presumption of innocence until the court is-sues a verdict. In stories from court rooms, the journalist will re-frain from mentioning the names of friends or relatives of people under investigation, except for the cases when this is required for an objective description of the case. The journalist will also refrain from mentioning the name of a crime victim and publish-ing information which may lead to the disclosure of the victim’s identity.
12. The journalist will respect the right of individuals to privacy. Public officers are also justified in not disclosing their private life except for the cases when their private life may affect their pub-lic activity. The restrictions on interference will also be strictly observed in relation to persons working in medical or similar in-stitutions.
13. The journalist will be aware that his status is incompatible with governmental, legislative or legal service, as well as with positions of leadership in political parties and other politically-oriented organisations. The journalist will be aware that his pro-fessional activity will be suspended as soon as he takes a weapon in hand.
14. The journalist ought not to follow his profession with the main objective of acquiring prestige and personal influence. The journalist will see as undignified the situation when he would use his reputation, authority, as well as his professional possi-bilities in order to publish commercial information or advertising, especially when the nature of such information is not obvious in the form in which it is published. The mere combination of jour-nalistic and advertising activities is deemed inadmissible from an ethical point of view.
15. The journalist should not use for personal ends or in the in-terest of people in close acquaintance with him, confidential in-formation that he possesses by virtue of his profession.
16. The journalist will value and protect the professional rights of fellow journalists, and will observe the laws of fair competi-tion. The journalist will respect, and will make others respect, the copyright in any creative area. Plagiarism is inadmissible. Every time a journalist will use, in any way, work done by other journalists, he will refer to the author’s name.
17. During his contacts with public authorities or various busi-nesses in the course of carrying out his professional duties, the journalist ought to avoid any complicity that may affect his inde-pendence and impartiality.
18. The journalist will reject any assignment if it might lead him into violating any of the principles set in this Code of Ethics.
19. The journalist will make use of, and protect, his right to use all guarantees provided by the civil and criminal legislation of the Republic of Moldova in law bodies and in others.
20. The present code of ethical principles may serve as argu-mentative basis in cases reviewed by law bodies and other bod-ies, in any litigation which involves the journalist himself or the product of his professional activity.
21. In order to render applicable the principles set forth in the present Code of Professional Ethics journalists should create a monitoring mechanism. Such a mechanism is represented by the National Professional Ethics Board for Journalists, which has its own Rules of Operation, consists of famous journalists, is elected by the Convention of the Journalists’ Union of Moldova, and signed by representatives from all the media or-ganisations in the Republic of Moldova, being thereby recog-nised by all the journalists working in the media throughout the country.
22. Should there be a corresponding request from law bodies or other bodies, the National Ethics Board may issue examination resolutions for a litigation involving the journalist himself or the product of his professional activity, and is the only expert body in this area of professional self-regulation.
luni, 30 noiembrie 2009
Pachetu lu Lupu
Principiile si actiunile propuse Partidului Comunistilor pentru votarea Presedintelui Republicii Moldova au fost prezentate conducerii PCRM pe cale oficiala de catre candidatul la funtia de sef al statului, Marian Lupu, în dimineata zilei de astazi, 26 noiembrie.
Vezi mai jos întreg pachetul de propuneri.
1. Adoptarea Legii privind opozitia parlamentara în vederea asigurarii principiului egalitatii partidelor în desfasurarea activitatilor parlamentare,
2. Dreptul opozitiei parlamentare de a desemna conducerea Curtii de Conturi si a Comisiei Electorale Centale,
3. Promovarea unor politici economice social orientate si consolidarea mecanismelor de protectie sociala,
4. Respectarea prevederilor constitutionale si mentinerea statutului de neutralitate al RM,
5. Realizarea politicii de reintegrare a tarii în baza respectarii suveranitatii si integrarii teritoriale a R. Moldova. Identificarea unei solutii durabile si viabile a solutionarii problemei transnistrene cu participarea si consultarea tuturor fortelor politice repezentate în Parlament,
6. Consolidarea si eficientizarea mecanismelor menite sa asigure drepturile tuturor grupurilor etnice, crearea conditiilor pentru participarea lor activa în viata publica a tarii,
7. Consolidarea democratiei locale. Promovarea unei relatii coerente si egale în raport cu toate autoritatile administratiei publice locale, bazata pe prioritati social-economice ale localitatilor si populatiei, si nu pe criterii de apartenenta politica a primarilor sau consilierilor locali,
8. Excluderea practicii persecutarii pe criterii de simpatie sau afiliere politica a agentilor economici care activeaza în conformitate cu prevederile legale,
9. Oranizarea sectorului audio-vizual public în spiritul minimalizarii influentei politice fata de procesul de desemnare a membrilor CCA si CO al TRM,
10. Deideologizarea sistemului educational si abordarea echilibrata a problemei predarii istoriei RM prin prisma abordarii stiintifice si pluralismului de opinie, exprimat prin prisma diversitatii culturale si integrarii sociale si excuderea ingerintelor politice , a subiectivismului stiintific si a ideologizarii voluntariste,
11. Promovarea spiritului de dialog si compromis politic, combaterea manifestarilor de intoleranta agresiva ideological,
12. Promovarea politicilor îndreptate spre consolidarea statalitatii Republicii Moldova, combaterea fenomenelor iredentiste ce pot submina suveranitatea tarii.
Vezi mai jos întreg pachetul de propuneri.
1. Adoptarea Legii privind opozitia parlamentara în vederea asigurarii principiului egalitatii partidelor în desfasurarea activitatilor parlamentare,
2. Dreptul opozitiei parlamentare de a desemna conducerea Curtii de Conturi si a Comisiei Electorale Centale,
3. Promovarea unor politici economice social orientate si consolidarea mecanismelor de protectie sociala,
4. Respectarea prevederilor constitutionale si mentinerea statutului de neutralitate al RM,
5. Realizarea politicii de reintegrare a tarii în baza respectarii suveranitatii si integrarii teritoriale a R. Moldova. Identificarea unei solutii durabile si viabile a solutionarii problemei transnistrene cu participarea si consultarea tuturor fortelor politice repezentate în Parlament,
6. Consolidarea si eficientizarea mecanismelor menite sa asigure drepturile tuturor grupurilor etnice, crearea conditiilor pentru participarea lor activa în viata publica a tarii,
7. Consolidarea democratiei locale. Promovarea unei relatii coerente si egale în raport cu toate autoritatile administratiei publice locale, bazata pe prioritati social-economice ale localitatilor si populatiei, si nu pe criterii de apartenenta politica a primarilor sau consilierilor locali,
8. Excluderea practicii persecutarii pe criterii de simpatie sau afiliere politica a agentilor economici care activeaza în conformitate cu prevederile legale,
9. Oranizarea sectorului audio-vizual public în spiritul minimalizarii influentei politice fata de procesul de desemnare a membrilor CCA si CO al TRM,
10. Deideologizarea sistemului educational si abordarea echilibrata a problemei predarii istoriei RM prin prisma abordarii stiintifice si pluralismului de opinie, exprimat prin prisma diversitatii culturale si integrarii sociale si excuderea ingerintelor politice , a subiectivismului stiintific si a ideologizarii voluntariste,
11. Promovarea spiritului de dialog si compromis politic, combaterea manifestarilor de intoleranta agresiva ideological,
12. Promovarea politicilor îndreptate spre consolidarea statalitatii Republicii Moldova, combaterea fenomenelor iredentiste ce pot submina suveranitatea tarii.
sâmbătă, 14 noiembrie 2009
perlele lui voronin
„M-am întâlnit cu Lupu și numai bâl-bâl din el. Bâl-bâl și iar bâl-bâl. Doi metri de bulbuci."
„S-au lăsat duși de nas ca niște jiței nesoverșenoletnie." (Despre Marian Lupu şi Dumitru Diacov)
„Partidul Liberal și Partidul Democrat - krokodil so zmeioi."
„AIE - sorok let bez urojaia."
„Oamenii nu ne-au votat pentru ca noi să-l facem pe aista cu 3 operații la cap președinte al parlamentului"
„Eu m-am învățat a prinde pește când m-am mutat la vila Condrița. Că te saturi toată ziua să stai numai cu ochii în hârțoage. Și mi-am cumpărat undițe. Prindeam pește la care capul era de două ori mai mare decât tulovișcea (туловище). Corcituri!"
„Pentru oameni ca Gorincioi eu am o singură caracteristică - merzaveț." (Despre Gheorghe Gorincioi, președintele Consiliului Coordonator al Audiovizualui)
„Bun, vă urez succes în toate. Și să nu boliți de grip!"
„S-au lăsat duși de nas ca niște jiței nesoverșenoletnie." (Despre Marian Lupu şi Dumitru Diacov)
„Partidul Liberal și Partidul Democrat - krokodil so zmeioi."
„AIE - sorok let bez urojaia."
„Oamenii nu ne-au votat pentru ca noi să-l facem pe aista cu 3 operații la cap președinte al parlamentului"
„Eu m-am învățat a prinde pește când m-am mutat la vila Condrița. Că te saturi toată ziua să stai numai cu ochii în hârțoage. Și mi-am cumpărat undițe. Prindeam pește la care capul era de două ori mai mare decât tulovișcea (туловище). Corcituri!"
„Pentru oameni ca Gorincioi eu am o singură caracteristică - merzaveț." (Despre Gheorghe Gorincioi, președintele Consiliului Coordonator al Audiovizualui)
„Bun, vă urez succes în toate. Și să nu boliți de grip!"
luni, 27 iulie 2009
Voronin l-a vizitat pe Dragos
Voronin l-a vizitat pe Dragos
Presedintele in exercitiu, Vladimir Voronin, a facut astazi cunostinta cu un pui de zimbru, care s-a nascut in rezervatia Padurea Domneasca, se arata intr-un comunicat al institutiei prezidentiale.
Puiul de zimbru are 45 de zile si il cheama Dragos, in cinstea marelui voievod, intemeietorul legendar al statului moldovenesc, se mai spune in comunicat.
Voronin s-a bucurat cand la vazut pe Dragos si „s-a aratat increzator de faptul ca zimbrii se vor raspandi in curand in padurile Moldovei”.
Cei 3 zimbri din Padurea Domneasca, doua femele, Kagura si Pogwarka, si un mascul, Rodeauvaci, au fost adusi acum 4 ani din Polonia. In curand va veni pe lume al doilea pui de zimbru.
Presedintele in exercitiu, Vladimir Voronin, a facut astazi cunostinta cu un pui de zimbru, care s-a nascut in rezervatia Padurea Domneasca, se arata intr-un comunicat al institutiei prezidentiale.
Puiul de zimbru are 45 de zile si il cheama Dragos, in cinstea marelui voievod, intemeietorul legendar al statului moldovenesc, se mai spune in comunicat.
Voronin s-a bucurat cand la vazut pe Dragos si „s-a aratat increzator de faptul ca zimbrii se vor raspandi in curand in padurile Moldovei”.
Cei 3 zimbri din Padurea Domneasca, doua femele, Kagura si Pogwarka, si un mascul, Rodeauvaci, au fost adusi acum 4 ani din Polonia. In curand va veni pe lume al doilea pui de zimbru.
luni, 22 iunie 2009
Un nou „7 aprilie”?
Constantin Tănase
Tanase-editorial.jpg
Declaraţiile lui V. Voronin demonstrează că regimul comunist de la Chişinău pregăteşte opinia publică internă şi internaţională pentru o evoluţie sângeroasă a evenimentelor după scrutinul din 29 iulie.
5 aprilie, 7 aprilie, 3 iunie, 29 iulie…?
Nimeni nu poate spune cu o doză suficientă de certitudine cum se vor încheia alegerile anticipate din 29 iulie a.c. Toţi înţeleg că declaraţiile optimiste ale liderilor ambelor tabere sunt echivalente semantic cu zicătoarea „Nu te teme, fricosule, căci şi eu mă tem!”. Este greu de presupus că vreuna din tabere - fie Puterea, fie Opoziţia - îşi va îmbunătăţi sau îşi va înrăutăţi cu mult situaţia, de aceea, nu este exclus ca după scrutinul din 29 iulie armatele beligerante să revină la linia iniţială a frontului. În acest sens, o Putere responsabilă ar trebui să fie preocupată de pregătirea unui climat pozitiv pentru dialogul ce ar urma să aibă loc imediat după scrutin. Ceea ce se întâmplă însă - mă refer la comportamentul Puterii - te face să te treacă fiori reci, fiindcă ea, Puterea, imediat după 7 aprilie, apoi după 3 iunie, dar cu turaţii mai mari, a declanşat mecanismul demonizării Opoziţiei, prezentând-o drept vinovata principală pentru toate eşecurile regimului de la 2001 încoace. Cel mai periculos însă, o adevărată provocare, este decuparea Opoziţiei din contextul politic intern şi tratarea ei ca pe un factor politic cu implicaţii externe, geopolitice. Această concluzie au confirmat-o încă o dată declaraţiile de sâmbătă ale lui V. Voronin făcute pentru Agenţia rusă de ştiri „RIA Novosti”.
Încă o dată despre fraudarea alegerilor
În context, este interesant să revenim la „filozofia” fraudării alegerilor şi la metodica demonstrării fraudelor. Continui să cred că alegerile din 5 aprilie au fost fraudate, dar lucrul acesta nu este atât de simplu să-l probezi, fiindcă ele au fost fraudate nu atât în parametrii lor tehnici, cât în esenţa lor. Adică, a fost fraudat însuşi procesul electoral, procesul şi contextul politic în care ele au decurs - toată campania electorală a fost un proces ticălos de dezinformare, spălare a creierilor şi manipulare a societăţii în direcţia dorită de comunişti. În această situaţie nici nu mai era nevoie să-ţi murdăreşti mâinile cu falsificarea listelor sau a buletinelor de vot. Exact acelaşi lucru se întâmplă şi după 5 aprilie: societatea este victima unei campanii de manipulare fără precedent. Sunt reactivate aceleaşi tehnici, începând cu împărţirea ajutoarelor umanitare de către prima doamnă a ţării, continuând cu apariţia în fiecare seară la sticlă a soţului ei şi terminând cu lansarea „filmelor” în care Opoziţia e declarată antistatală. Opoziţia nu are cu ce răspunde la aceste atacuri - ca şi până la 5 aprilie, ea nu are acces la Radioteleviziunea publică, din care cauză la canonada neîntreruptă a artileriei Puterii Opoziţia răspunde prin focuri răzleţe, cu gloanţe oarbe - conferinţe de presă care-s mai mult pentru ziarişti decât pentru masele largi. De aici putem trage o singură concluzie: deja la acest moment alegerile din 29 iulie sunt fraudate - ele nu decurg liber şi corect pentru că Puterea nu asigură Opoziţiei aceleaşi condiţii de care beneficiază ea însăşi.
Cum prezintă Voronin Opoziţia din Moldova
Să ne întoarcem acum la interviul lui Voronin acordat agenţiei ruse de ştiri. Tema centrală a interviului a fost… Opoziţia din R. Moldova. (Nu-mi amintesc vreun alt caz când un şef de stat ar acorda un interviu unei publicaţii sau agenţii de presă străine, în care ar critica Opoziţia din propria ţară. Îmi imaginez cum ar reacţiona Voronin dacă liderii Opoziţiei ar acorda interviuri unor mass-media din România în care ar pune la îndoială neprihănirea politică a primelor persoane din stat…) Mesajul central transmis opiniei publice este următorul: Opoziţia din R. Moldova este antistatală. Dacă-i antistatală, urmează că-i anticonstituţională şi cu ea trebuie să se procedeze în consecinţă. Transferarea subiectului „statalităţii R. Moldova” pe câmpul minat al războiului electoral este o diversiune periculoasă, care poate avea consecinţe tragice pentru R. Moldova. Iată, pe puncte, cum a prezentat Voronin opiniei publice din Rusia Opoziţia din propria lui ţară.
* 1. Dacă opoziţia din Ucraina şi Georgia a ieşit în piaţă cu lozinci patriotice, Opoziţia noastră - cu drapelele altui stat şi cu lozincile unirii cu România”, de aceea, la noi nu a fost vorba de vreo revoluţie oranj, ci de… „revoluţia trădătorilor”. (Apropo, în mass-media comuniste de la Chişinău „trădătorii” mai sunt numiţi „teroriştii lui Băsescu”. Precum se ştie, nicăieri în lume cu teroriştii nu se negociază”. Ce trebuie să urmeze - e clar…)
* 2. Voronin acuză că anume Opoziţia ar fi torpilat procesul de soluţionare a diferendului transnistrean: „Scenariul pus în aplicare pe 7 aprilie în centrul Chişinăului a fost un răspuns isteric (al Opoziţiei) la întâlnirea din 18 martie cu D. Medvedev - întâlnire după care apăruse perspectiva reală a reunirii Moldovei”.
* 3. În spatele evenimentelor din 7 aprilie, declară Voronin, se află România şi ele „urmau să convingă locuitorii RMN în imposibilitatea unirii”. Potrivit lui, „în această direcţie au lucrat şi lozincile pro-româneşti ale Opoziţiei, şi arborarea drapelelor româneşti pe sediul administraţiei preşedintelui, şi poziţia autorităţilor şi a presei româneşti”, dar şi preşedintele României care a sprijinit deschis opoziţia noastră radicală”.
* 4. Potrivit lui Voronin alegerile anticipate sunt „o continuare a politicii 7 aprilie”, scopul lor fiind transformarea R. Moldova „într-o regiune de conflict, într-o a doua Transnistrie”. Astfel, scopul Opoziţiei este „de a scăpa de Transnistria şi de a da Moldova sub un protectorat internaţional pe vreo 20 de ani, ca apoi s-o alipească la România”.
* 5. Pentru Voronin, „partidele reacţionare liberale moldoveneşti sunt nu atât oponente ale PCRM, cât ale Moldovei”. Ca urmare, continuă Voronin, „logica Opoziţiei nu se reduce la simpla sarcină de a înlătura comuniştii de la putere, ci de a lichida independenţa R. Moldova”.
* 6. În mod logic, din cele spuse mai sus, alegerile anticipate, deduce Voronin, „vor provoca o catastrofă geopolitică serioasă, în care vor fi atrase şi România, şi Ucraina, şi Rusia”.
* 7. Şi parcă părându-i că cele spuse până aici nu sunt suficient de convingătoare, Voronin a încheiat-o pe un ton sincer, foarte personal - „Sincer să fiu, mie mi-e ruşine de această Opoziţie”.
Să nu ni se pară o glumă
Sincer să fiu, şi mie mi-e ruşine de acest… preşedinte. Şi nu doar mi-e ruşine, ci mi-e şi frică, pentru că prin asemenea declaraţii el, de facto, pregăteşte un nou „7 aprilie” după alegerile din 29 iulie. Dacă la aceste declaraţii marţiale ale lui Voronin adăugăm ţipetele isterice ale propagandei sale despre un posibil război civil, devine clar că Puterea de la Chişinău a devenit periculoasă şi ne pregăteşte ceva foarte urât. Ca să nu arunce R. Moldova în hăul unui coşmar sângeros, această Putere ar trebui să fie monitorizată cu maximă atenţie de comunitatea internaţională. Să nu ni se pară o glumă: venind înaripat de la Moscova, Voronin va avea mână liberă să se răzbune şi să pună capăt, în sfârşit, nesuferitei „Opoziţii antistatale” care n-a dorit să-i dea un vot pe 3 iunie…
Tanase-editorial.jpg
Declaraţiile lui V. Voronin demonstrează că regimul comunist de la Chişinău pregăteşte opinia publică internă şi internaţională pentru o evoluţie sângeroasă a evenimentelor după scrutinul din 29 iulie.
5 aprilie, 7 aprilie, 3 iunie, 29 iulie…?
Nimeni nu poate spune cu o doză suficientă de certitudine cum se vor încheia alegerile anticipate din 29 iulie a.c. Toţi înţeleg că declaraţiile optimiste ale liderilor ambelor tabere sunt echivalente semantic cu zicătoarea „Nu te teme, fricosule, căci şi eu mă tem!”. Este greu de presupus că vreuna din tabere - fie Puterea, fie Opoziţia - îşi va îmbunătăţi sau îşi va înrăutăţi cu mult situaţia, de aceea, nu este exclus ca după scrutinul din 29 iulie armatele beligerante să revină la linia iniţială a frontului. În acest sens, o Putere responsabilă ar trebui să fie preocupată de pregătirea unui climat pozitiv pentru dialogul ce ar urma să aibă loc imediat după scrutin. Ceea ce se întâmplă însă - mă refer la comportamentul Puterii - te face să te treacă fiori reci, fiindcă ea, Puterea, imediat după 7 aprilie, apoi după 3 iunie, dar cu turaţii mai mari, a declanşat mecanismul demonizării Opoziţiei, prezentând-o drept vinovata principală pentru toate eşecurile regimului de la 2001 încoace. Cel mai periculos însă, o adevărată provocare, este decuparea Opoziţiei din contextul politic intern şi tratarea ei ca pe un factor politic cu implicaţii externe, geopolitice. Această concluzie au confirmat-o încă o dată declaraţiile de sâmbătă ale lui V. Voronin făcute pentru Agenţia rusă de ştiri „RIA Novosti”.
Încă o dată despre fraudarea alegerilor
În context, este interesant să revenim la „filozofia” fraudării alegerilor şi la metodica demonstrării fraudelor. Continui să cred că alegerile din 5 aprilie au fost fraudate, dar lucrul acesta nu este atât de simplu să-l probezi, fiindcă ele au fost fraudate nu atât în parametrii lor tehnici, cât în esenţa lor. Adică, a fost fraudat însuşi procesul electoral, procesul şi contextul politic în care ele au decurs - toată campania electorală a fost un proces ticălos de dezinformare, spălare a creierilor şi manipulare a societăţii în direcţia dorită de comunişti. În această situaţie nici nu mai era nevoie să-ţi murdăreşti mâinile cu falsificarea listelor sau a buletinelor de vot. Exact acelaşi lucru se întâmplă şi după 5 aprilie: societatea este victima unei campanii de manipulare fără precedent. Sunt reactivate aceleaşi tehnici, începând cu împărţirea ajutoarelor umanitare de către prima doamnă a ţării, continuând cu apariţia în fiecare seară la sticlă a soţului ei şi terminând cu lansarea „filmelor” în care Opoziţia e declarată antistatală. Opoziţia nu are cu ce răspunde la aceste atacuri - ca şi până la 5 aprilie, ea nu are acces la Radioteleviziunea publică, din care cauză la canonada neîntreruptă a artileriei Puterii Opoziţia răspunde prin focuri răzleţe, cu gloanţe oarbe - conferinţe de presă care-s mai mult pentru ziarişti decât pentru masele largi. De aici putem trage o singură concluzie: deja la acest moment alegerile din 29 iulie sunt fraudate - ele nu decurg liber şi corect pentru că Puterea nu asigură Opoziţiei aceleaşi condiţii de care beneficiază ea însăşi.
Cum prezintă Voronin Opoziţia din Moldova
Să ne întoarcem acum la interviul lui Voronin acordat agenţiei ruse de ştiri. Tema centrală a interviului a fost… Opoziţia din R. Moldova. (Nu-mi amintesc vreun alt caz când un şef de stat ar acorda un interviu unei publicaţii sau agenţii de presă străine, în care ar critica Opoziţia din propria ţară. Îmi imaginez cum ar reacţiona Voronin dacă liderii Opoziţiei ar acorda interviuri unor mass-media din România în care ar pune la îndoială neprihănirea politică a primelor persoane din stat…) Mesajul central transmis opiniei publice este următorul: Opoziţia din R. Moldova este antistatală. Dacă-i antistatală, urmează că-i anticonstituţională şi cu ea trebuie să se procedeze în consecinţă. Transferarea subiectului „statalităţii R. Moldova” pe câmpul minat al războiului electoral este o diversiune periculoasă, care poate avea consecinţe tragice pentru R. Moldova. Iată, pe puncte, cum a prezentat Voronin opiniei publice din Rusia Opoziţia din propria lui ţară.
* 1. Dacă opoziţia din Ucraina şi Georgia a ieşit în piaţă cu lozinci patriotice, Opoziţia noastră - cu drapelele altui stat şi cu lozincile unirii cu România”, de aceea, la noi nu a fost vorba de vreo revoluţie oranj, ci de… „revoluţia trădătorilor”. (Apropo, în mass-media comuniste de la Chişinău „trădătorii” mai sunt numiţi „teroriştii lui Băsescu”. Precum se ştie, nicăieri în lume cu teroriştii nu se negociază”. Ce trebuie să urmeze - e clar…)
* 2. Voronin acuză că anume Opoziţia ar fi torpilat procesul de soluţionare a diferendului transnistrean: „Scenariul pus în aplicare pe 7 aprilie în centrul Chişinăului a fost un răspuns isteric (al Opoziţiei) la întâlnirea din 18 martie cu D. Medvedev - întâlnire după care apăruse perspectiva reală a reunirii Moldovei”.
* 3. În spatele evenimentelor din 7 aprilie, declară Voronin, se află România şi ele „urmau să convingă locuitorii RMN în imposibilitatea unirii”. Potrivit lui, „în această direcţie au lucrat şi lozincile pro-româneşti ale Opoziţiei, şi arborarea drapelelor româneşti pe sediul administraţiei preşedintelui, şi poziţia autorităţilor şi a presei româneşti”, dar şi preşedintele României care a sprijinit deschis opoziţia noastră radicală”.
* 4. Potrivit lui Voronin alegerile anticipate sunt „o continuare a politicii 7 aprilie”, scopul lor fiind transformarea R. Moldova „într-o regiune de conflict, într-o a doua Transnistrie”. Astfel, scopul Opoziţiei este „de a scăpa de Transnistria şi de a da Moldova sub un protectorat internaţional pe vreo 20 de ani, ca apoi s-o alipească la România”.
* 5. Pentru Voronin, „partidele reacţionare liberale moldoveneşti sunt nu atât oponente ale PCRM, cât ale Moldovei”. Ca urmare, continuă Voronin, „logica Opoziţiei nu se reduce la simpla sarcină de a înlătura comuniştii de la putere, ci de a lichida independenţa R. Moldova”.
* 6. În mod logic, din cele spuse mai sus, alegerile anticipate, deduce Voronin, „vor provoca o catastrofă geopolitică serioasă, în care vor fi atrase şi România, şi Ucraina, şi Rusia”.
* 7. Şi parcă părându-i că cele spuse până aici nu sunt suficient de convingătoare, Voronin a încheiat-o pe un ton sincer, foarte personal - „Sincer să fiu, mie mi-e ruşine de această Opoziţie”.
Să nu ni se pară o glumă
Sincer să fiu, şi mie mi-e ruşine de acest… preşedinte. Şi nu doar mi-e ruşine, ci mi-e şi frică, pentru că prin asemenea declaraţii el, de facto, pregăteşte un nou „7 aprilie” după alegerile din 29 iulie. Dacă la aceste declaraţii marţiale ale lui Voronin adăugăm ţipetele isterice ale propagandei sale despre un posibil război civil, devine clar că Puterea de la Chişinău a devenit periculoasă şi ne pregăteşte ceva foarte urât. Ca să nu arunce R. Moldova în hăul unui coşmar sângeros, această Putere ar trebui să fie monitorizată cu maximă atenţie de comunitatea internaţională. Să nu ni se pară o glumă: venind înaripat de la Moscova, Voronin va avea mână liberă să se răzbune şi să pună capăt, în sfârşit, nesuferitei „Opoziţii antistatale” care n-a dorit să-i dea un vot pe 3 iunie…
marți, 16 iunie 2009
EXPLICATIE: MAI JOS VEDETI UN SCENARIU DE CLIP AL PLDM, CARE A FOST ATASAT LA UN COMUNICAT DE PRESA EMIS DE ACEST PARTID. MAI ATENTI, ACOLO, BAIETII RESPONSABILI DE PRESA
SCENARIUL SPOTULUI
Scena 1
Ascunzînduse de ploae sub coroana stejarului bunicul si nepotelul
( plan general )
Bnunicul
----------- De cînd e Tara asta doar numai stejarii au rezistat! Privind in zori cum nourii se impraştie!
Scena 2
Mina bunelului pe scoata stejarului ( plan gro )
Scena 3
Bunicul tine puietul de spejar si nepotelul pune pamint la tulpină
( plan mediu )
Bunicul
------------- Şi numai sadind stejarul Tău nepoţele iţi intăreşti Tara !
Scena 3
Copacel ,nepotelul ,bunicul ,copacul – stejarul pe fundal de cer cu soare!
( plan panoramă ) din fată
---------Alege stejarul , alege viitorul tau senin ! simbolul PLDM !
SCENARIUL SPOTULUI
Scena 1
Ascunzînduse de ploae sub coroana stejarului bunicul si nepotelul
( plan general )
Bnunicul
----------- De cînd e Tara asta doar numai stejarii au rezistat! Privind in zori cum nourii se impraştie!
Scena 2
Mina bunelului pe scoata stejarului ( plan gro )
Scena 3
Bunicul tine puietul de spejar si nepotelul pune pamint la tulpină
( plan mediu )
Bunicul
------------- Şi numai sadind stejarul Tău nepoţele iţi intăreşti Tara !
Scena 3
Copacel ,nepotelul ,bunicul ,copacul – stejarul pe fundal de cer cu soare!
( plan panoramă ) din fată
---------Alege stejarul , alege viitorul tau senin ! simbolul PLDM !
joi, 4 iunie 2009
Un aliat de-al PCRM se plânge de „înveninarea din societate”
public aceasta stire cum am scris-o in caz ca ar putea aparea alte versiuni la alte media
Preşedintele Partidului Popular Creştin Democrat (PPCD), Iurie Roşca, s-a referit la „înveninarea din societate” la o conferinţă de presă, joi, 4 iunie, la care şi-a împărtăşit jurnaliştilor viziunile sale despre recentele evenimente din R. Moldova, transmite Info-Prim Neo.
Referindu-se la tulburările în masă din 7 aprilie, el a spus că: „aceste violenţe au fost posibile într-o măsură determinantă de radicalizarea opţiunilor electorale. Dacă şi de acum în colo viaţa politică din RM va fi atât de înveninată, încât actorii politici se vor privi unii pe alţii ca pe nişte duşmani ireconciliabili, cetăţeanul va avea numai de pierdut”.
Întrebat de reporterul Info-Prim Neo, dacă el personal şi figuri marcante din PPCD au vreo contribuţie la intensificarea învrăjbirii din societate, Roşca a spus: „Dvs. ştiţi cât de dificile au fost raporturile noastre cu PCRM până în anul 2005, până la 4 aprilie. Să facem o paralelă între 4 aprilie 2005 versus 7 aprilie 2009. Ce a fost mai necesar pentru RM, un compromis rezonabil, util intereselor RM sau o confruntare exemplară cu incedieri de sedii, cu violenţe?” s-a întrebat politicianul.
Info-Prim notează că pe 7 aprilie protestarii şi-au răsfrânt mânia şi asupra unui autoturism aparţinând staţiei EU TV. Iurie Roşca a evitat să spună, la conferinţă, ce legătură există între PPCD şi EU TV, dar monitorizări de media efectuate de Asociaţia Presei Electronice APEL, constată că acest canal TV nu critică creştin-democraţii şi comuniştii (PCRM), în schimb acordă enorm timpi de antenă pentru a pune în lumină negativă cele trei partide de opoziţie care au intrat în parlament.
În apropiatele alegeri anticipate PPCD va merge de unul singur.
Fiind unul din cele mai vechi partide moldoveneşti, PPCD a stârnit stupefacţie în societate când a votat pentru alegerea comunistului Vladimir Voronin în funcţia de şef al statului la 4 aprilie, 2005. În acel an pentru acest partid au votat peste 140 de mii de alegători. La alegerile locale din 2007, PPCD a acumulat 98 de mii de sufragii, iar la parlamentarele din 2009 a adunat peste 46 de mii, fiind lăsat astfel în afara parlamentului.
Preşedintele Partidului Popular Creştin Democrat (PPCD), Iurie Roşca, s-a referit la „înveninarea din societate” la o conferinţă de presă, joi, 4 iunie, la care şi-a împărtăşit jurnaliştilor viziunile sale despre recentele evenimente din R. Moldova, transmite Info-Prim Neo.
Referindu-se la tulburările în masă din 7 aprilie, el a spus că: „aceste violenţe au fost posibile într-o măsură determinantă de radicalizarea opţiunilor electorale. Dacă şi de acum în colo viaţa politică din RM va fi atât de înveninată, încât actorii politici se vor privi unii pe alţii ca pe nişte duşmani ireconciliabili, cetăţeanul va avea numai de pierdut”.
Întrebat de reporterul Info-Prim Neo, dacă el personal şi figuri marcante din PPCD au vreo contribuţie la intensificarea învrăjbirii din societate, Roşca a spus: „Dvs. ştiţi cât de dificile au fost raporturile noastre cu PCRM până în anul 2005, până la 4 aprilie. Să facem o paralelă între 4 aprilie 2005 versus 7 aprilie 2009. Ce a fost mai necesar pentru RM, un compromis rezonabil, util intereselor RM sau o confruntare exemplară cu incedieri de sedii, cu violenţe?” s-a întrebat politicianul.
Info-Prim notează că pe 7 aprilie protestarii şi-au răsfrânt mânia şi asupra unui autoturism aparţinând staţiei EU TV. Iurie Roşca a evitat să spună, la conferinţă, ce legătură există între PPCD şi EU TV, dar monitorizări de media efectuate de Asociaţia Presei Electronice APEL, constată că acest canal TV nu critică creştin-democraţii şi comuniştii (PCRM), în schimb acordă enorm timpi de antenă pentru a pune în lumină negativă cele trei partide de opoziţie care au intrat în parlament.
În apropiatele alegeri anticipate PPCD va merge de unul singur.
Fiind unul din cele mai vechi partide moldoveneşti, PPCD a stârnit stupefacţie în societate când a votat pentru alegerea comunistului Vladimir Voronin în funcţia de şef al statului la 4 aprilie, 2005. În acel an pentru acest partid au votat peste 140 de mii de alegători. La alegerile locale din 2007, PPCD a acumulat 98 de mii de sufragii, iar la parlamentarele din 2009 a adunat peste 46 de mii, fiind lăsat astfel în afara parlamentului.
miercuri, 3 iunie 2009
l'UE face à la Turquie
*
Alain Juppé - Michel Rocard :
l'UE face à la Turquie
Propos recueillis par Pierre Rousselin et Paul-François Paoli
03/06/2009 | Mise à jour : 12:23 | Commentaires 24 | Ajouter à ma sélection
DÉBAT - À la veille des élections européennes, les deux anciens premiers ministres débattent des liens que l'Europe pourrait nouer avec la Turquie. Car, à travers ceux-ci, c'est l'identité et le fonctionnement de l'Union qui sont en jeu.
LE FIGARO. - La question de la Turquie ne cesse de planer sur les débats concernant l'Europe. Le président de la République a redit son hostilité à l'intégration de la Turquie à l'Union. Pourquoi ce sujet fait-il peur ?
Alain JUPPÉ. - S'agissant de la Turquie, il y a le cœur et la raison. Du côté du cœur, je suis turcophile. J'aime ce pays où j'ai souvent voyagé. C'est un pays formidable, et ses habitants le sont aussi. Pourtant, la raison me fait dire que transformer la Turquie en 28e ou 29e État de l'Europe, c'est changer d'Europe. Et je n'y suis pas favorable. Je rappelle que c'est sous ma présidence que l'UMP a pris position contre l'adhésion de ce pays et pour un partenariat privilégié. Cette position n'obéit pas à des motifs religieux ou culturels. L'Europe est laïque, et toutes les religions y ont leur place, y compris l'islam, deuxième religion de France et troisième d'Europe. Mon refus n'est pas d'ordre civilisationnel non plus. La Turquie est-elle en Asie ou en Europe ? Ce que je sais, c'est qu'en 1453, Constantinople était la capitale de l'Empire romain d'Orient et que Sainte-Sophie était une basilique chrétienne. J'ai vu les plus beaux sites antiques sur la côte ionienne de Troie à Milet en passant par Pergame et Éphèse, et, en Cappadoce, j'ai vu aussi des monastères chrétiens du IV e au XI e siècle. On trouve en Turquie toutes les couches de civilisation des cinq mille ou six mille dernières années en Europe. Ma motivation est économique et politique, j'y viendrai au cours du débat…
Michel ROCARD. - D'accord pour dire que nous changeons d'Europe si la Turquie la rejoint. Mais l'Europe a déjà tellement changé ! L'Europe fédérale, telle que nous, démocrates-chrétiens et socialistes, la voulions, c'est-à-dire capable de parler d'une seule voix en matière diplomatique et militaire, est morte. Elle a été assassinée au moment du traité de Maastricht quand a été choisi le principe d'unanimité. Principe confirmé par les traités d'Amsterdam et de Nice et le projet de Constitution européenne que la France et les Pays-Bas ont rejeté. Telle est la conséquence de la politique britannique en Europe. Admise depuis 1972, l'Angleterre a toujours refusé l'émergence d'un bloc continental. Elle préfère que nous soyons divisés… ! L'Europe unie n'existe donc pas. On l'a vu en Yougoslavie, durant la guerre ; on continue de le vérifier dans nos relations avec la Chine. Nous sommes un ensemble de pays qui se sont donné des règles économiques parallèles et un club de nations qui gardent leur identité. Chacun conservant sa langue, sa diplomatie, sa vision du monde. Dans ce contexte, je ne vois pas au nom de quoi nous refuserions aux Turcs l'accès à une Europe qui serait le moyen de renforcer une paix régionale dont ce pays peut être l'artisan.
Une Europe des États ne peut donc pas être un acteur politique de poids sur la scène internationale ?
M. R. - Sa chance est beaucoup plus faible que si elle était fédérale. Le rêve des pères fondateurs était que l'Europe puisse se conduire comme les États-Unis, la Russie, la Chine grâce à une diplomatie unifiée. C'est impossible aujourd'hui. Pour que l'Europe agisse, il faut le temps d'obtenir l'unanimité au Conseil des ministres ! Il y a, c'est vrai, des exceptions : quand quelqu'un entraîne les autres sans respecter les procédures. C'est arrivé grâce au dynamisme de Sarkozy. L'Europe ne pèse aujourd'hui que quand la coalition de ses grandes nations tombe d'accord. Pourquoi ne pas associer la Turquie à cette configuration ? Nous y aurions intérêt sur un plan géopolitique.
A. J. - L'Europe fédérale est morte, mais comme cela n'a jamais été le projet de ma formation politique, je ne m'en plains pas. Contrairement à vous, je crois que l'Europe politique existe même s'il n'y a pas un président qui parle en son nom de manière constante. Il le fait pendant six mois dans le cadre d'une construction qui réussit à associer des États-nations qui ont leur culture et leur histoire. Malgré cela, des processus de décision donnent aux instances communautaires de vrais pouvoirs. Prenons l'exemple du G20 : ce n'est pas la France seule qui a pesé, c'est la France et l'Allemagne. À l'OMC, c'est de même l'Europe qui pèse avec un commissaire qui s'exprime en son nom. Et aujourd'hui, il peut y avoir des actions communes dans le domaine de la défense, comme en ce moment au large des côtes de Djibouti. Pour revenir à la Turquie, mon opposition est d'abord d'ordre économique. L'Europe n'est pas l'Aléna ni le Mercosur, c'est une zone de solidarité dans laquelle les plus avancés aident les plus faibles. Nous l'avons fait avec la Grèce, le Portugal et l'Irlande, et en ce moment pour la Pologne et les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale. Mais il y a une limite : nous n'avons pas la capacité d'absorber un pays comme la Turquie. Ensuite ma réticence est aussi politique. Si l'Europe n'a pas de frontière, elle n'est plus l'Europe. Et si on fait entrer la Turquie, au nom de quoi refuser l'Ukraine, la Moldavie, le Maroc ou Israël ? Ce serait une Europe américaine. Or je continue de penser que l'Europe peut être porteuse d'un projet de civilisation original.
M. R. - Si Les Turcs étaient prêts à accepter le partenariat privilégié que vous proposez, je comprendrais votre position, mais celui-ci me paraît compromis. Pour trois raisons. D'abord une question d'honneur. L'Europe a donné sa parole en 1963. Ensuite, il y a l'aide à apporter à la Turquie et enfin la question géostratégique. La première demande d'adhésion de la Turquie est de 1959. Nous avons mis quatre ans à répondre, mais en 1963 le texte stipulait que la Turquie avait vocation à être membre. La déclaration européenne était unanime et de Gaulle l'avait paraphée. Enfin, il y a l'histoire turque elle-même. Depuis Pékin aux murailles de Vienne, l'Empire turc a régné, et leur territoire actuel est pour les Turcs une forme d'humiliation. C'est un peuple fier, puissant militairement, la deuxième armée du Moyen-Orient. Or ce pays a joué son destin sur son tropisme européen. Ses derniers sultans se sont inspirés de l'Occident, et Kemal Atatürk a accentué ce processus. Des liens spéciaux existent avec nous depuis longtemps et on ne peut aller plus loin dans le partenariat avec ce pays membre de l'Otan ! Que faire de plus ? Pour les Turcs, ce refus est une gifle qui risque de renforcer le nationalisme
En quoi pourrait consister un partenariat plus important ?
A. J. - C'est vrai qu'en 1963 l'Europe a dit : nous allons vous accueillir. Nous étions en 1963, on était neuf et il y avait les deux blocs. Il faut respecter sa parole, mais ce ne serait pas la première fois dans l'histoire qu'on l'adapte aux circonstances. Vous avez raison de dire que la Turquie est un pays d'importance stratégique. Il joue un rôle de médiation positive dans une région du monde où la paix est fragile. Il faut donc tout faire pour éviter qu'il ne glisse dans le camp de l'intégrisme. Nous avons déjà avec lui un accord d'association économique ratifié quand j'étais ministre des Affaires étrangères. Dans le cadre d'un partenariat privilégié, nous pouvons aller plus loin dans la coopération politique, universitaire, culturelle, de recherche. Il faut avoir le courage, à l'instar de Nicolas Sarkozy, de proposer autre chose. Pour l'instant, la Turquie s'y refuse ; pour des raisons de fierté compréhensibles. Ce n'est pas une raison pour ne pas assumer notre position. Entrer dans l'Union européenne relève d'abord de notre décision.
M. R. - En Turquie, les sondages donnent désormais une opinion défavorable à l'Union européenne. Je ne vois pas bien ce que peut apporter un nouveau partenariat à des Turcs qui ont le sentiment qu'on leur a craché au visage. On ne peut oublier non plus que les cinq républiques turcophones à la lisière de ce pays constituent une seconde Arabie saoudite du point de vue des réserves de pétrole. Or ces nations sont soumises à trois types d'influence : influence mafieuse de l'héritage communiste, influence islamiste et influence turque. Si dans ces zones, auxquelles nous avons besoin d'accéder pour des raisons commerciales et stratégiques, l'influence turque devient europhobe, nous serons lésés. En plus, la Turquie a besoin de notre aide pour régler la question du génocide arménien, ou aussi pour régler l'affaire kurde. C'était la pression de l'adhésion à l'Europe qui permettait cela ! Nous courons le risque de voir la Turquie aller dans le sens d'un blocage des réformes et d'un durcissement de l'armée. Ou de les renvoyer dans les bras américains…
A. J. - Je comprends vos inquiétudes. Moi-même j'ai évolué sur la question. Vous auriez raison si notre refus devait précipiter la Turquie dans l'extrémisme. Mais je n'y crois pas. Nous dire que si nous n'accueillons pas la Turquie il va se produire le pire relève d'une forme de chantage. J'ai confiance dans la responsabilité des élites et du peuple turc. Ils n'ont pas envie de basculer dans l'europhobie. En outre, vous dites aussi : si on ne les intègre pas, on les rejette dans les bras américains ! Il faut choisir ! Regardez ce qui se passe avec l'Arménie. Le dialogue aura le dessus sur l'immobilisme. Et puis, l'interland turcophone que vous avez évoqué, faut-il aussi le faire entrer dans l'Union ?
Pour vous, Michel Rocard, l'intégration de la Turquie faciliterait nos relations avec le monde musulman ?
M. R. - L'adhésion turque familiariserait l'Europe à la présence de l'Islam, et le monde musulman serait, de son côté, moins tenté par l'europhobie. Mais je suis moins optimiste que vous. Il y a dans l'histoire des glissements de terrain qui peuvent être surprenants. Nous allons payer d'une hostilité croissante notre refus. La Turquie avait connu avant la crise financière une croissance de 5 à 6 % par an pendant sept à huit ans, notamment grâce à des investissements venus d'Europe qui s'étaient développés dans la perspective de l'union au marché commun. Le repli de la Turquie va ralentir sa croissance, ce qui va réactiver l'émigration vers l'extérieur. Alors que nous sortons d'une période où la Turquie cherchait à rapatrier chez elle les plus qualifiés de ses membres. C'est une situation dramatique dont je crains les conséquences belligènes…
A. J. - Vous nous avez dit que l'intégration économique était déjà réalisée. Une fois la crise surmontée, je suis persuadé que la coopération économique et les investissements européens reprendront dans un pays qui restera attractif et dynamique. La question est de savoir si on peut éviter le tout ou rien. S'il n'y a pas de choix entre les deux, alors effectivement, cela pose un problème. Mais je suis convaincu que la solution de partenariat privilégié, une fois la déception passée, pourra prospérer.
M. R. - Si l'Europe s'était faite conformément à mon rêve fédéraliste, je dirais non à la Turquie, comme je dirais non à l'Ukraine, mais comme on a cassé ce rêve et qu'il nous faut un extrême labeur pour tomber d'accord, il me semble que cette recherche ne doit pas nous interdire de partager nos règles du jeu. Ces règles - État de droit et démocratie -, le monde entier les demande. Que notre club s'élargisse en dehors des frontières géographiques de l'Europe, ici vers la Turquie, là vers l'Ukraine, j'y vois d'immenses avantages pour le monde de demain. Shimon Pérès me disait, voilà quelques années, que son rêve était de rejoindre l'Europe, Territoires palestiniens compris, parce que seule cette intégration pourrait mettre un terme à un conflit sans fin avec les Palestiniens.
A. J. - Après la Turquie, le Maroc, Israël, la Palestine… Si on allait dans ce sens, il faudrait alors refaire l'Europe avec ceux qui veulent une politique de sécurité commune, des actions de politique étrangère et une politique économique soutenant une monnaie commune. Bref, revenir à la petite Europe. C'est encore évitable : l'Union telle qu'elle est, élargie aux Balkans, tient la route et se fait entendre sur la scène mondiale.
C'est une déception pour vous, Michel Rocard, que les États-nations subsistent en Europe ?
M. R. - Oui, car les États-nations, c'est la guerre, François Mitterrand l'avait dit au Bundestag où il avait été approuvé.
A. J. - Mitterrand avait condamné le nationalisme, pas l'État-nation. Il faut distinguer «le patriotisme, qui est l'amour de soi, du nationalisme, qui est la haine de l'autre», disait Jaurès… ou de Gaulle. Je suis pour les États-nations, c'est la différence entre le rêve américain et le rêve européen. L'Amérique est un État fédéral constitué à partir d'éléments qui n'étaient pas des nations. L'Europe s'est constituée à partir des identités nationales. Nous avons démontré que l'on pouvait concilier l'existence de l'Europe et de l'État-nation. Il nous faut continuer sur cette voie.
Alain Juppé, que répondez-vous à ceux qui affirment que c'est sur la pression de l'opinion «populiste» que vous avez évolué ?
A. J. - Tenir compte de l'opinion de 65 % de la population, est-ce du populisme ou de la démocratie ? Mais ce n'est pas cela qui m'a décidé. J'ai réfléchi et évolué. Le fait que je sois d'accord avec 65 % des Français me rassure plutôt.
M. R. - Il faut évidemment respecter l'opinion publique, mais on n'a pas fait le travail d'explication nécessaire. Toute l'élite turque est européanisée et largement francophone. Ceux-là ne veulent pas entendre parler de partenariat spécial. Et nous allons les décevoir terriblement. C'est ce que je regrette…
Alain Juppé - Michel Rocard :
l'UE face à la Turquie
Propos recueillis par Pierre Rousselin et Paul-François Paoli
03/06/2009 | Mise à jour : 12:23 | Commentaires 24 | Ajouter à ma sélection
DÉBAT - À la veille des élections européennes, les deux anciens premiers ministres débattent des liens que l'Europe pourrait nouer avec la Turquie. Car, à travers ceux-ci, c'est l'identité et le fonctionnement de l'Union qui sont en jeu.
LE FIGARO. - La question de la Turquie ne cesse de planer sur les débats concernant l'Europe. Le président de la République a redit son hostilité à l'intégration de la Turquie à l'Union. Pourquoi ce sujet fait-il peur ?
Alain JUPPÉ. - S'agissant de la Turquie, il y a le cœur et la raison. Du côté du cœur, je suis turcophile. J'aime ce pays où j'ai souvent voyagé. C'est un pays formidable, et ses habitants le sont aussi. Pourtant, la raison me fait dire que transformer la Turquie en 28e ou 29e État de l'Europe, c'est changer d'Europe. Et je n'y suis pas favorable. Je rappelle que c'est sous ma présidence que l'UMP a pris position contre l'adhésion de ce pays et pour un partenariat privilégié. Cette position n'obéit pas à des motifs religieux ou culturels. L'Europe est laïque, et toutes les religions y ont leur place, y compris l'islam, deuxième religion de France et troisième d'Europe. Mon refus n'est pas d'ordre civilisationnel non plus. La Turquie est-elle en Asie ou en Europe ? Ce que je sais, c'est qu'en 1453, Constantinople était la capitale de l'Empire romain d'Orient et que Sainte-Sophie était une basilique chrétienne. J'ai vu les plus beaux sites antiques sur la côte ionienne de Troie à Milet en passant par Pergame et Éphèse, et, en Cappadoce, j'ai vu aussi des monastères chrétiens du IV e au XI e siècle. On trouve en Turquie toutes les couches de civilisation des cinq mille ou six mille dernières années en Europe. Ma motivation est économique et politique, j'y viendrai au cours du débat…
Michel ROCARD. - D'accord pour dire que nous changeons d'Europe si la Turquie la rejoint. Mais l'Europe a déjà tellement changé ! L'Europe fédérale, telle que nous, démocrates-chrétiens et socialistes, la voulions, c'est-à-dire capable de parler d'une seule voix en matière diplomatique et militaire, est morte. Elle a été assassinée au moment du traité de Maastricht quand a été choisi le principe d'unanimité. Principe confirmé par les traités d'Amsterdam et de Nice et le projet de Constitution européenne que la France et les Pays-Bas ont rejeté. Telle est la conséquence de la politique britannique en Europe. Admise depuis 1972, l'Angleterre a toujours refusé l'émergence d'un bloc continental. Elle préfère que nous soyons divisés… ! L'Europe unie n'existe donc pas. On l'a vu en Yougoslavie, durant la guerre ; on continue de le vérifier dans nos relations avec la Chine. Nous sommes un ensemble de pays qui se sont donné des règles économiques parallèles et un club de nations qui gardent leur identité. Chacun conservant sa langue, sa diplomatie, sa vision du monde. Dans ce contexte, je ne vois pas au nom de quoi nous refuserions aux Turcs l'accès à une Europe qui serait le moyen de renforcer une paix régionale dont ce pays peut être l'artisan.
Une Europe des États ne peut donc pas être un acteur politique de poids sur la scène internationale ?
M. R. - Sa chance est beaucoup plus faible que si elle était fédérale. Le rêve des pères fondateurs était que l'Europe puisse se conduire comme les États-Unis, la Russie, la Chine grâce à une diplomatie unifiée. C'est impossible aujourd'hui. Pour que l'Europe agisse, il faut le temps d'obtenir l'unanimité au Conseil des ministres ! Il y a, c'est vrai, des exceptions : quand quelqu'un entraîne les autres sans respecter les procédures. C'est arrivé grâce au dynamisme de Sarkozy. L'Europe ne pèse aujourd'hui que quand la coalition de ses grandes nations tombe d'accord. Pourquoi ne pas associer la Turquie à cette configuration ? Nous y aurions intérêt sur un plan géopolitique.
A. J. - L'Europe fédérale est morte, mais comme cela n'a jamais été le projet de ma formation politique, je ne m'en plains pas. Contrairement à vous, je crois que l'Europe politique existe même s'il n'y a pas un président qui parle en son nom de manière constante. Il le fait pendant six mois dans le cadre d'une construction qui réussit à associer des États-nations qui ont leur culture et leur histoire. Malgré cela, des processus de décision donnent aux instances communautaires de vrais pouvoirs. Prenons l'exemple du G20 : ce n'est pas la France seule qui a pesé, c'est la France et l'Allemagne. À l'OMC, c'est de même l'Europe qui pèse avec un commissaire qui s'exprime en son nom. Et aujourd'hui, il peut y avoir des actions communes dans le domaine de la défense, comme en ce moment au large des côtes de Djibouti. Pour revenir à la Turquie, mon opposition est d'abord d'ordre économique. L'Europe n'est pas l'Aléna ni le Mercosur, c'est une zone de solidarité dans laquelle les plus avancés aident les plus faibles. Nous l'avons fait avec la Grèce, le Portugal et l'Irlande, et en ce moment pour la Pologne et les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale. Mais il y a une limite : nous n'avons pas la capacité d'absorber un pays comme la Turquie. Ensuite ma réticence est aussi politique. Si l'Europe n'a pas de frontière, elle n'est plus l'Europe. Et si on fait entrer la Turquie, au nom de quoi refuser l'Ukraine, la Moldavie, le Maroc ou Israël ? Ce serait une Europe américaine. Or je continue de penser que l'Europe peut être porteuse d'un projet de civilisation original.
M. R. - Si Les Turcs étaient prêts à accepter le partenariat privilégié que vous proposez, je comprendrais votre position, mais celui-ci me paraît compromis. Pour trois raisons. D'abord une question d'honneur. L'Europe a donné sa parole en 1963. Ensuite, il y a l'aide à apporter à la Turquie et enfin la question géostratégique. La première demande d'adhésion de la Turquie est de 1959. Nous avons mis quatre ans à répondre, mais en 1963 le texte stipulait que la Turquie avait vocation à être membre. La déclaration européenne était unanime et de Gaulle l'avait paraphée. Enfin, il y a l'histoire turque elle-même. Depuis Pékin aux murailles de Vienne, l'Empire turc a régné, et leur territoire actuel est pour les Turcs une forme d'humiliation. C'est un peuple fier, puissant militairement, la deuxième armée du Moyen-Orient. Or ce pays a joué son destin sur son tropisme européen. Ses derniers sultans se sont inspirés de l'Occident, et Kemal Atatürk a accentué ce processus. Des liens spéciaux existent avec nous depuis longtemps et on ne peut aller plus loin dans le partenariat avec ce pays membre de l'Otan ! Que faire de plus ? Pour les Turcs, ce refus est une gifle qui risque de renforcer le nationalisme
En quoi pourrait consister un partenariat plus important ?
A. J. - C'est vrai qu'en 1963 l'Europe a dit : nous allons vous accueillir. Nous étions en 1963, on était neuf et il y avait les deux blocs. Il faut respecter sa parole, mais ce ne serait pas la première fois dans l'histoire qu'on l'adapte aux circonstances. Vous avez raison de dire que la Turquie est un pays d'importance stratégique. Il joue un rôle de médiation positive dans une région du monde où la paix est fragile. Il faut donc tout faire pour éviter qu'il ne glisse dans le camp de l'intégrisme. Nous avons déjà avec lui un accord d'association économique ratifié quand j'étais ministre des Affaires étrangères. Dans le cadre d'un partenariat privilégié, nous pouvons aller plus loin dans la coopération politique, universitaire, culturelle, de recherche. Il faut avoir le courage, à l'instar de Nicolas Sarkozy, de proposer autre chose. Pour l'instant, la Turquie s'y refuse ; pour des raisons de fierté compréhensibles. Ce n'est pas une raison pour ne pas assumer notre position. Entrer dans l'Union européenne relève d'abord de notre décision.
M. R. - En Turquie, les sondages donnent désormais une opinion défavorable à l'Union européenne. Je ne vois pas bien ce que peut apporter un nouveau partenariat à des Turcs qui ont le sentiment qu'on leur a craché au visage. On ne peut oublier non plus que les cinq républiques turcophones à la lisière de ce pays constituent une seconde Arabie saoudite du point de vue des réserves de pétrole. Or ces nations sont soumises à trois types d'influence : influence mafieuse de l'héritage communiste, influence islamiste et influence turque. Si dans ces zones, auxquelles nous avons besoin d'accéder pour des raisons commerciales et stratégiques, l'influence turque devient europhobe, nous serons lésés. En plus, la Turquie a besoin de notre aide pour régler la question du génocide arménien, ou aussi pour régler l'affaire kurde. C'était la pression de l'adhésion à l'Europe qui permettait cela ! Nous courons le risque de voir la Turquie aller dans le sens d'un blocage des réformes et d'un durcissement de l'armée. Ou de les renvoyer dans les bras américains…
A. J. - Je comprends vos inquiétudes. Moi-même j'ai évolué sur la question. Vous auriez raison si notre refus devait précipiter la Turquie dans l'extrémisme. Mais je n'y crois pas. Nous dire que si nous n'accueillons pas la Turquie il va se produire le pire relève d'une forme de chantage. J'ai confiance dans la responsabilité des élites et du peuple turc. Ils n'ont pas envie de basculer dans l'europhobie. En outre, vous dites aussi : si on ne les intègre pas, on les rejette dans les bras américains ! Il faut choisir ! Regardez ce qui se passe avec l'Arménie. Le dialogue aura le dessus sur l'immobilisme. Et puis, l'interland turcophone que vous avez évoqué, faut-il aussi le faire entrer dans l'Union ?
Pour vous, Michel Rocard, l'intégration de la Turquie faciliterait nos relations avec le monde musulman ?
M. R. - L'adhésion turque familiariserait l'Europe à la présence de l'Islam, et le monde musulman serait, de son côté, moins tenté par l'europhobie. Mais je suis moins optimiste que vous. Il y a dans l'histoire des glissements de terrain qui peuvent être surprenants. Nous allons payer d'une hostilité croissante notre refus. La Turquie avait connu avant la crise financière une croissance de 5 à 6 % par an pendant sept à huit ans, notamment grâce à des investissements venus d'Europe qui s'étaient développés dans la perspective de l'union au marché commun. Le repli de la Turquie va ralentir sa croissance, ce qui va réactiver l'émigration vers l'extérieur. Alors que nous sortons d'une période où la Turquie cherchait à rapatrier chez elle les plus qualifiés de ses membres. C'est une situation dramatique dont je crains les conséquences belligènes…
A. J. - Vous nous avez dit que l'intégration économique était déjà réalisée. Une fois la crise surmontée, je suis persuadé que la coopération économique et les investissements européens reprendront dans un pays qui restera attractif et dynamique. La question est de savoir si on peut éviter le tout ou rien. S'il n'y a pas de choix entre les deux, alors effectivement, cela pose un problème. Mais je suis convaincu que la solution de partenariat privilégié, une fois la déception passée, pourra prospérer.
M. R. - Si l'Europe s'était faite conformément à mon rêve fédéraliste, je dirais non à la Turquie, comme je dirais non à l'Ukraine, mais comme on a cassé ce rêve et qu'il nous faut un extrême labeur pour tomber d'accord, il me semble que cette recherche ne doit pas nous interdire de partager nos règles du jeu. Ces règles - État de droit et démocratie -, le monde entier les demande. Que notre club s'élargisse en dehors des frontières géographiques de l'Europe, ici vers la Turquie, là vers l'Ukraine, j'y vois d'immenses avantages pour le monde de demain. Shimon Pérès me disait, voilà quelques années, que son rêve était de rejoindre l'Europe, Territoires palestiniens compris, parce que seule cette intégration pourrait mettre un terme à un conflit sans fin avec les Palestiniens.
A. J. - Après la Turquie, le Maroc, Israël, la Palestine… Si on allait dans ce sens, il faudrait alors refaire l'Europe avec ceux qui veulent une politique de sécurité commune, des actions de politique étrangère et une politique économique soutenant une monnaie commune. Bref, revenir à la petite Europe. C'est encore évitable : l'Union telle qu'elle est, élargie aux Balkans, tient la route et se fait entendre sur la scène mondiale.
C'est une déception pour vous, Michel Rocard, que les États-nations subsistent en Europe ?
M. R. - Oui, car les États-nations, c'est la guerre, François Mitterrand l'avait dit au Bundestag où il avait été approuvé.
A. J. - Mitterrand avait condamné le nationalisme, pas l'État-nation. Il faut distinguer «le patriotisme, qui est l'amour de soi, du nationalisme, qui est la haine de l'autre», disait Jaurès… ou de Gaulle. Je suis pour les États-nations, c'est la différence entre le rêve américain et le rêve européen. L'Amérique est un État fédéral constitué à partir d'éléments qui n'étaient pas des nations. L'Europe s'est constituée à partir des identités nationales. Nous avons démontré que l'on pouvait concilier l'existence de l'Europe et de l'État-nation. Il nous faut continuer sur cette voie.
Alain Juppé, que répondez-vous à ceux qui affirment que c'est sur la pression de l'opinion «populiste» que vous avez évolué ?
A. J. - Tenir compte de l'opinion de 65 % de la population, est-ce du populisme ou de la démocratie ? Mais ce n'est pas cela qui m'a décidé. J'ai réfléchi et évolué. Le fait que je sois d'accord avec 65 % des Français me rassure plutôt.
M. R. - Il faut évidemment respecter l'opinion publique, mais on n'a pas fait le travail d'explication nécessaire. Toute l'élite turque est européanisée et largement francophone. Ceux-là ne veulent pas entendre parler de partenariat spécial. Et nous allons les décevoir terriblement. C'est ce que je regrette…
marți, 26 mai 2009
Putin to the West: Hands Off Ukraine
By James Marson / Kiev
Vladimir Putin, Russia's prime minister and former president, is not renowned for his love of literature. But on Sunday he gave Russian journalists an unexpected reading tip: the diaries of Anton Denikin, a commander in the White Army that fought the Bolsheviks after the Revolution in 1917. (See TIME's photos of last year's war in Georgia)
"He has a discussion there about Big Russia and Little Russia — Ukraine," Russian newswires quoted Putin as saying after laying a wreath in Moscow at the grave of Denikin, who is now portrayed as a Russian patriot. "He says that no one should be allowed to interfere in relations between us; they have always been the business of Russia itself." (See TIME's person of the year: Vladimir Putin)
Putin's words are seen as the latest in an ongoing volley of pointed warnings to the West not to meddle in Ukraine, a country with such close historical and cultural ties to Russia that the Kremlin considers it firmly within its sphere of interests.
"The Russian leadership is very apprehensive about what it sees as Western moves designed to tear Ukraine away from Russia," says Dmitry Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, an independent think tank in Moscow. "Their central foreign policy goal is to create a power center around Russia. Any move by the West towards the former Soviet republics is seen as damaging Russia's interests."
Moscow has reacted angrily to Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko's attempts in recent years to gain NATO membership, and to a recent agreement in March for the European Union to help modernize Ukraine's aging gas transport system. "This agreement is Exhibit A in Moscow's collection [of complaints]," says Trenin. "It's evidence that Europe is concluding bilateral deals with Ukraine that undermine Russia's interests."
Russian leaders have also expressed concerns about the E.U.'s Eastern Partnership program, unveiled earlier this month, which aims to deepen economic and political ties with six former Soviet states, including Ukraine. At the E.U.-Russia summit in Khabarovsk over the weekend, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said E.U. officials had "failed to persuade" him that it was not harmful to Russian interests. "What confuses me is that some states... see this partnership as a partnership against Russia," he said.
Putin's reference on Sunday to "Little Russia" — a term used during the Russian Empire to describe parts of modern-day Ukraine that came under Tsarist rule — has raised hackles in Ukraine, where many consider it demeaning and offensive.
"These comments by Putin should be taken very seriously," says Olexandr Paliy, a political analyst with the Institute of Foreign Policy at the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Diplomatic Academy. "Russia is engaged in a propaganda war against Ukraine, designed to convince the West not to support Ukraine. Russia doesn't understand cooperation with equals, only with subordinates."
Putin is not known for his tact when speaking of Russia's western neighbor, which declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. In April 2008, a source told Russia's Kommersant newspaper how Putin described Ukraine to George Bush at a NATO meeting in Bucharest: "You don't understand, George, that Ukraine is not even a state. What is Ukraine? Part of its territories is Eastern Europe, but the greater part is a gift from us."
Such rhetoric led to fears that after its army's foray into South Ossetia in August, Russia would turn its attention to Ukraine's Crimean peninsula, which has a predominantly ethnic Russian population and is home to Russia's Black Sea Fleet. In an article in Ukraine's Den newspaper on Thursday, Yuriy Shcherbak, Ukraine's former ambassador to the U.S., wrote political analysts close to the Russian leadership were keen to portray Ukraine, which has huge economic woes and a political elite riven by in-fighting, as a "failed state."
"Aggressive conversations are taking place concerning Ukraine and the dividing of its territory... at various levels of the Russian political, military and secret service leadership," he wrote. In fact, other experts suggest, such belligerent talk is meant more as a corrective threat than a potential course of action. But even if Moscow has no immediate designs on Crimea, the continued flow of baleful utterances from the Kremlin does reflect a desire for what Medvedev has called Russia's "privileged interests" in the region to be respected — in terms of politics, business and culture.
And the Kremlin certainly has plenty of levers to pull in Ukraine to make its views felt, with its control over gas supplies, alongside the popularity of Russian state-controlled TV in the east and south of the country, where pro-Russian sentiment is strongest. "In certain sections of the Ukrainian political and business elite there are links with Russia stretching back to Soviet times," says Paliy from the Institute of Foreign Policy. "There are also a large number of Russian-sponsored think tanks in Ukraine, which function freely and push the Kremlin's views."
These levers are likely to play a significant role in Ukraine's upcoming presidential elections, set for next January. Last time round in 2004, Russia and Putin threw their weight behind then-Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, whose initial victory was overturned after massive protests after massive protests in Kiev against vote-rigging, which turned into the so-called the Orange Revolution. This time, analysts say that the Kremlin is likely to diversify its approach, with support for both Yanukovych and previously hostile Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, President Yushchenko's former Orange ally.
"The Russian leadership learnt one important lesson from 2004 — not to put all their eggs in one basket," says Trenin. Meanwhile Russians and Ukrainians alike will be watching for Putin's next trenchant explanation from literary history.
Vladimir Putin, Russia's prime minister and former president, is not renowned for his love of literature. But on Sunday he gave Russian journalists an unexpected reading tip: the diaries of Anton Denikin, a commander in the White Army that fought the Bolsheviks after the Revolution in 1917. (See TIME's photos of last year's war in Georgia)
"He has a discussion there about Big Russia and Little Russia — Ukraine," Russian newswires quoted Putin as saying after laying a wreath in Moscow at the grave of Denikin, who is now portrayed as a Russian patriot. "He says that no one should be allowed to interfere in relations between us; they have always been the business of Russia itself." (See TIME's person of the year: Vladimir Putin)
Putin's words are seen as the latest in an ongoing volley of pointed warnings to the West not to meddle in Ukraine, a country with such close historical and cultural ties to Russia that the Kremlin considers it firmly within its sphere of interests.
"The Russian leadership is very apprehensive about what it sees as Western moves designed to tear Ukraine away from Russia," says Dmitry Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, an independent think tank in Moscow. "Their central foreign policy goal is to create a power center around Russia. Any move by the West towards the former Soviet republics is seen as damaging Russia's interests."
Moscow has reacted angrily to Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko's attempts in recent years to gain NATO membership, and to a recent agreement in March for the European Union to help modernize Ukraine's aging gas transport system. "This agreement is Exhibit A in Moscow's collection [of complaints]," says Trenin. "It's evidence that Europe is concluding bilateral deals with Ukraine that undermine Russia's interests."
Russian leaders have also expressed concerns about the E.U.'s Eastern Partnership program, unveiled earlier this month, which aims to deepen economic and political ties with six former Soviet states, including Ukraine. At the E.U.-Russia summit in Khabarovsk over the weekend, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said E.U. officials had "failed to persuade" him that it was not harmful to Russian interests. "What confuses me is that some states... see this partnership as a partnership against Russia," he said.
Putin's reference on Sunday to "Little Russia" — a term used during the Russian Empire to describe parts of modern-day Ukraine that came under Tsarist rule — has raised hackles in Ukraine, where many consider it demeaning and offensive.
"These comments by Putin should be taken very seriously," says Olexandr Paliy, a political analyst with the Institute of Foreign Policy at the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Diplomatic Academy. "Russia is engaged in a propaganda war against Ukraine, designed to convince the West not to support Ukraine. Russia doesn't understand cooperation with equals, only with subordinates."
Putin is not known for his tact when speaking of Russia's western neighbor, which declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. In April 2008, a source told Russia's Kommersant newspaper how Putin described Ukraine to George Bush at a NATO meeting in Bucharest: "You don't understand, George, that Ukraine is not even a state. What is Ukraine? Part of its territories is Eastern Europe, but the greater part is a gift from us."
Such rhetoric led to fears that after its army's foray into South Ossetia in August, Russia would turn its attention to Ukraine's Crimean peninsula, which has a predominantly ethnic Russian population and is home to Russia's Black Sea Fleet. In an article in Ukraine's Den newspaper on Thursday, Yuriy Shcherbak, Ukraine's former ambassador to the U.S., wrote political analysts close to the Russian leadership were keen to portray Ukraine, which has huge economic woes and a political elite riven by in-fighting, as a "failed state."
"Aggressive conversations are taking place concerning Ukraine and the dividing of its territory... at various levels of the Russian political, military and secret service leadership," he wrote. In fact, other experts suggest, such belligerent talk is meant more as a corrective threat than a potential course of action. But even if Moscow has no immediate designs on Crimea, the continued flow of baleful utterances from the Kremlin does reflect a desire for what Medvedev has called Russia's "privileged interests" in the region to be respected — in terms of politics, business and culture.
And the Kremlin certainly has plenty of levers to pull in Ukraine to make its views felt, with its control over gas supplies, alongside the popularity of Russian state-controlled TV in the east and south of the country, where pro-Russian sentiment is strongest. "In certain sections of the Ukrainian political and business elite there are links with Russia stretching back to Soviet times," says Paliy from the Institute of Foreign Policy. "There are also a large number of Russian-sponsored think tanks in Ukraine, which function freely and push the Kremlin's views."
These levers are likely to play a significant role in Ukraine's upcoming presidential elections, set for next January. Last time round in 2004, Russia and Putin threw their weight behind then-Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, whose initial victory was overturned after massive protests after massive protests in Kiev against vote-rigging, which turned into the so-called the Orange Revolution. This time, analysts say that the Kremlin is likely to diversify its approach, with support for both Yanukovych and previously hostile Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, President Yushchenko's former Orange ally.
"The Russian leadership learnt one important lesson from 2004 — not to put all their eggs in one basket," says Trenin. Meanwhile Russians and Ukrainians alike will be watching for Putin's next trenchant explanation from literary history.
NATO says Georgia will join as maneuvers are held
By DAVID NOWAK – 13 hours ago
TBILISI, Georgia (AP) — NATO said Monday that Georgia will eventually become a member — reaffirming its support for the country with which it is hosting joint military exercises, to Russia's dismay.
Robert Simmons, NATO's special envoy to the Caucasus and Central Asia, refused to set a date for Georgia's entry into the military alliance, saying that would be futile. Georgia, a former Soviet republic that borders Russia, has been embroiled in domestic political infighting.
Russia has sharply criticized the war games being held near South Ossetia, a rebel-held separatist province that was at the center of the war last summer between Russia and Georgia. And confirmation of NATO's intent to accept Georgia will probably anger Russia.
NATO has said before that Georgia and Ukraine can eventually join the alliance despite Russia's opposition, but has stopped short of granting them a formal roadmap to membership.
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, criticized by the opposition for failing to avert the disastrous war, attended Monday's military exercises on a wind-blown hilltop base just outside the capital, Tbilisi.
Saakashvili has faced daily protests by thousands of opposition activists urging him to step down. He has said he will not leave office before his term ends in 2013.
Simmons said the way Saakashvili has allowed the opposition to protest virtually unhindered was a positive sign.
During Monday's training, American, Spanish, Italian and Greek soldiers walked Georgian military through various battlefield attack techniques. The Georgian soldiers trained with Russian-made weapons and fired at silhouette targets dotted around the field as NATO troops observed, occasionally intervening.
A helicopter landed just yards (meters) from the field in which the live-fire exercise was being conducted, drawing gasps from British personnel. The helicopter later whisked Saakashvili away.
TBILISI, Georgia (AP) — NATO said Monday that Georgia will eventually become a member — reaffirming its support for the country with which it is hosting joint military exercises, to Russia's dismay.
Robert Simmons, NATO's special envoy to the Caucasus and Central Asia, refused to set a date for Georgia's entry into the military alliance, saying that would be futile. Georgia, a former Soviet republic that borders Russia, has been embroiled in domestic political infighting.
Russia has sharply criticized the war games being held near South Ossetia, a rebel-held separatist province that was at the center of the war last summer between Russia and Georgia. And confirmation of NATO's intent to accept Georgia will probably anger Russia.
NATO has said before that Georgia and Ukraine can eventually join the alliance despite Russia's opposition, but has stopped short of granting them a formal roadmap to membership.
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, criticized by the opposition for failing to avert the disastrous war, attended Monday's military exercises on a wind-blown hilltop base just outside the capital, Tbilisi.
Saakashvili has faced daily protests by thousands of opposition activists urging him to step down. He has said he will not leave office before his term ends in 2013.
Simmons said the way Saakashvili has allowed the opposition to protest virtually unhindered was a positive sign.
During Monday's training, American, Spanish, Italian and Greek soldiers walked Georgian military through various battlefield attack techniques. The Georgian soldiers trained with Russian-made weapons and fired at silhouette targets dotted around the field as NATO troops observed, occasionally intervening.
A helicopter landed just yards (meters) from the field in which the live-fire exercise was being conducted, drawing gasps from British personnel. The helicopter later whisked Saakashvili away.
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